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Abstract
This paper addresses the question: what impact do trade unions have on
workplace governance, and how has this changed during two decades of
union decline? Using nationally representative data on employees in the
British Social Attitudes Surveys (BSAS) 1983–1998, we assess associations
between measures of unionisation and employee perceptions of three aspects
of workplace governance: the employee relations climate; managers’ treat-
ment of employees and unions; and managerial performance. The paper
provides broad support for the three hypotheses explored in the paper. First,
employees’ perceptions of workplace governance are better where there is a
balance of power between unions and management at the workplace.
Secondly, employees’ perceptions of workplace governance are better where
management supports union membership, and are poorest where they actively
discourage membership. Thirdly, employees’ perceptions of union effective-
ness are positively associated with employees’ perceptions of good workplace
governance.
A further hypothesis, namely that perceptions of governance will have
deteriorated since the 1980s in unionised workplaces due to the weaker
position of unions in the workplace, and to declining support for unions
among employers, was not supported. Perceptions of workplace governance
had deteriorated since the 1980s. However, these trends were apparent among
employees in unionised and non-unionised workplaces. There was no
evidence to suggest that the trend was associated with a diminution in union




This paper addresses the question: what impact do trade unions have on
workplace governance, and how has this changed during two decades of
union decline? Using nationally representative data on employees in the
British Social Attitudes Surveys (BSAS) 1983–1998, we assess associations
between measures of unionisation and employee perceptions of three aspects
of workplace governance:
• the relationship between management and employees at their workplace,
which we shall refer to as ‘the employee relations climate’;
• management’s treatment of employees and unions; and
• managerial performance.
The motivation for the paper is twofold. Until recently, most analyses of
attitudes towards workplace governance in Britain were based on data about
workplaces gathered primarily from managerial respondents, such as the
long-running series of Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS) (Fernie,
Metcalf and Woodland, 1994; Fernie and Metcalf, 1995; Wood and de
Menezes, 1998; Moreton, 1999). This began to change in the late 1990s,
with analyses of BSAS (Bryson and McKay, 1997) and the Workplace
Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS98) (Cully et al., 1999; Scholarios et
al., 1999; Bryson and Wilkinson, 2001). Analyses of WERS98 emphasise the
importance of adding to the body of knowledge about employees’ percep-
tions by showing that there is substantial discordance between the perceptions
of managerial respondents and those of other employees, with the former
proving more positive in their outlook (Cully et al., 1999; Bryson and
Wilkinson, 2001). The analyses presented in this paper extend earlier research
on employee perceptions by exploring union effects on a wider range of gover-
nance measures, and by assessing the impact of unions over time.
The second motivation for the paper is to provide a context in which to
appraise the impact of the statutory procedure for union recognition contained
in the Employment Relations Act, which has been in effect since 6 June 2000.
In its White Paper, the government argued that effective unions are conducive
to good employee relations. Moreover, it claimed that harmonious employee
relations based on partnership between workers and their employer improve
both the working lives of individuals and the performance of organisations.
However, it also argued that these benefits may be jeopardised if, against the
wishes of their employees, employers refuse to recognise a union for pay
bargaining and worker representation. Accordingly, the legislation compels
employers to recognise trade unions where a majority of employees so wish.1
Our data pre-date the legislation, when employers were at liberty to decide
whether or not to recognise unions, so it is not possible to infer directly from
our results whether the new statutory provisions will improve workplace
governance.2 Even if we were to find that the presence of recognised trade
unions was associated with good employee relations, we would have to
acknowledge that forcing employers to recognise a union against their wishes
could well sour employee relations rather than improve them. Indeed, some
critics of the new legislation have pointed to the failure of previous statutory
arrangements for union recognition introduced in the early 1970s, suggesting
that it demonstrated that compelling employers to deal with trades unions will
be damaging to the conduct of employee relations (Confederation of British
Industry, 1998). However, our analysis can shed light on two issues that are
fundamental to any consideration of the links between unions and workplace
governance, irrespective of the statutory environment. The first is whether the
presence of recognised unions has a beneficial effect on governance and, if so,
under what circumstances. As discussed below, evidence has emerged recently
that the influence of unions is diminishing even where, at least nominally, they
continue to be granted recognition rights. There are theoretical grounds for
suspecting that this development will adversely affect workplace relations. The
second issue we can illuminate is whether the impact of unions depends on
how management reacts to them. We contend that good employee relations
can only be fashioned with the support of management and workers: it is not
simply a gift to be bestowed by one side or the other, no matter how willing
they may be.
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1 Under the legislation, employers with more than 20 employees are required to recognise
unions for bargaining on pay, hours and holidays if a majority of relevant workers demonstrate
support for it. To achieve recognition, a union must show in a secret ballot that it has the
support of 40 per cent of those working in the bargaining unit, as well as a majority of those
voting. Alternatively, the union can demonstrate that more than half of the workers in the unit
are union members.
2 For an attempt to do so using historical and international comparative analysis, see Wood
and Godard (1999).
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 discusses trends in
unionisation and employer and employee orientations to unions which might
have a bearing on union influence over workplace governance. Section 3
outlines theoretical links between unions and workplace governance and the
three hypotheses tested in the paper. In Section 4 we introduce the BSAS data
used in our analyses. Section 5 discusses our analytical approach. Results are
presented in Section 6, and Section 7 gives conclusions.
2. BACKGROUND
The fifteen years covered by our data were a period of continuous decline for
trade unions. The unionised sector shrank due to falls in membership and a
rapid drop in the number of employers recognising unions for collective
bargaining (Millward et al., 2000). These trends are reflected in our BSAS data:
the number of employees saying they were currently a union member fell from
one-half to one-third between 1983 and 1998 (Appendix Table A1),3 while the
number saying there was a union or staff association recognised for pay
bargaining purposes at their workplace fell from two-thirds to one-half
(Appendix Table A2).4 But the issue at the heart of this paper is: what influence
do unions have where they retain a foothold in the workplace? We focus on
three aspects of unionisation which, according to theories discussed in Section
3, influence both the size and direction of union effects on workplace gover-
nance. These are union strength, employee assessments of managerial support
for unions, and the effectiveness of unions as perceived by employees.
Unions’ influence in the workplace derives from their bargaining power,
and stems from their ability to disrupt the supply of labour in pursuance of
their members’ interests. But it also comes from the union’s role as the repres-
entative ‘voice’ of employees in the resolution of workplace grievances and
disputes. Both sources of influence depend on the credibility of the union in
claiming to represent the workforce. This seems to have diminished since the
early 1980s for, even where unions continue to be recognised for bargaining
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3 The table presents membership rates for union membership only, and for membership of
unions and staff associations. The union membership figures for 1989 onwards correspond very
closely to those obtained using the Labour Force Survey (Hicks, 2000), although there is a
small increase in membership between 1990 and 1991 in the BSAS data which is not apparent
in the LFS.
4 Throughout the paper we distinguish between staff associations and staff association
membership, on the one hand, and unions and union membership on the other, in our analyses
of the BSAS98 data. However, in our repeat cross-section analyses, union and staff association
measures are combined.
purposes, there has been a decline in the proportion of employees whose
terms and conditions are set by collective bargaining and the proportion who
are union members (Millward et al., 2000; Bryson and Wilkinson, 2001).
The only data available on employees’ perceptions of union power over time
are from BSAS for 1989 and 1998. They confirm that, since the late 1980s,
there has been a decline in the perceived power of unions at the workplace
(Table 1).
Unions’ loss of organisational and bargaining strength may explain the
absence of a general union wage mark-up (Stewart, 1995; Forth and
Millward, 2000) and, by 1998, the disappearance of negative union effects
on workplace financial performance usually attributed to the monopoly
power of unions (Addison and Belfield, 2000; Bryson and Wilkinson, 2001).
However, the decline in these ‘average’ union effects for some workplace
outcomes is by no means the whole story. First, some average union effects
remain powerful. For instance, unionised workplaces had slower growth rates
than non-unionised workplaces in the 1990s, ceteris paribus, suggesting that
union effects are not benign (Bryson, 2001). Secondly, many workplaces still
have ‘strong’ unions with high membership, high bargaining coverage and
on-site lay representation (Millward et al., 2000: 179–183). One might expect
the ‘returns’ to well-organised, or strong, unions to be relatively greater now
that average union strength has declined. Forth and Millward (2000) confirm
this in their analyses of the union wage premium. They found that, by 1998,
there was no general union premium, but there was a sizeable mark-up in
workplaces with high bargaining coverage. Thirdly, as discussed in greater
detail below, even weak unions may still have appreciable effects on employee
perceptions of workplace governance.
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Table 1: Employee perceptions of union power, 1989–1998
1989 1998
Far too much * *
Too much 4 2
Right amount 52 45
Too little 32 41
Far too little 6 6
DK/Can’t say 6 5
Weighted 822 753
Unweighted 852 714
Source: BSAS. Based on responses to the question: ‘Do you think that the (trade unions/staff
association/trade unions or staff association) at your workplace (has/have) too much or too little
power? Please use a phrase from this card.’ Base is employees working 10 or more hours per
week in workplaces with a recognised union or staff association. 
Note: * means under 0.5 per cent.
What has caused the general decline in the ‘take-up’ of unions among its
customers, namely employees, and employers, lies beyond the scope of this
paper.5 However, as discussed in Section 3, employer support for unions and
employee perceptions of the job done by unions may be important in explain-
ing the effects of unions on employee perceptions of workplace governance.
Trends in these two factors provide useful background to the discussion of
their effects on workplace governance below.
Where employers are at liberty to choose whether they recognise trade
unions, unions are heavily reliant on the support, or at least acquiescence, of
management to conduct their business in representing members. This was the
case for the period up to 1998 for which we have data.6 However, BSAS data
support evidence from other employee surveys (Gallie et al., 1998: 107) that
employer endorsement of union membership among its employees has fallen
since the mid-1980s (Table 2). Survey evidence from managers in workplaces
recognising unions shows that, while management endorsement of union
membership rose in the 1980s, partly offsetting the decline in the closed shop,
endorsement of membership declined markedly in the 1990s, along with a
decline in the closed shop (Millward et al., 2000: 145–149). Interestingly,
Table 2 shows that the decline in managerial support for union membership
Table 2: Employee perceptions of management attitudes to union
membership at their workplace, 1989–1998
1989 1998
No recog Recog Total No recog Recog Total
Encourages * 18 10 1 11 6
Accepts 4 52 32 8 54 30
Discourages 18 5 10 17 5 11
Not an issue 75 23 45 68 27 48
Don’t know 2 2 2 6 2 4
Not answered 1 * 1 * 0 *
Weighted 607 825 1432 791 753 1544
Unweighted 607 855 1462 714 714 1428
Source: BSAS. 
Note: based on responses to the question: ‘How would you describe the management’s attitude to
trade unions at the place where you work? Would you say that management encourages trade union
membership, accepts it or would accept it, discourages trade union membership, or isn’t it really an
issue at your workplace?’ Based on employees working 10 or more hours per week. 
Note: * means under 0.5 per cent.
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5 For discussion of this issue, see Millward et al., 2000; Metcalf, 2000; Machin, 2000.
6 Although statutory rights to recognition under the Employment Relations Act 1999 (footnote
1) diminish reliance on employers for formal recognition, in practice it is likely that unions will
remain reliant on employer support if they are to make effective representations on behalf of
their members.
was confined to unionised workplaces. Union derecognition was relatively
rare over the period (Millward et al., 2000: 103–104). Instead, where employ-
ers continue to recognise unions, they appear to be capitalising on changes in
the labour market and the legal framework which have strengthened their
bargaining power vis-à-vis employees to refashion their relationship with
organised labour. In 1998, a clear majority of managers in workplaces recog-
nising unions expressed a preference for consulting directly with employees
rather than with unions (Appendix Table A3). This is consistent with case
studies uncovering instances in which recognised unions are by-passed in
managerial decision-making (Marchington and Parker, 1990; Darlington,
1994), and evidence from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey
(WERS98) on ‘the extent to which worker representatives were excluded
altogether from the province of many workplace issues’ (Cully et al., 1999:
105). These considerations may lead us to suspect that managers are less
constrained than they were in the 1980s in pursuing corporate goals,
sometimes at the expense of employees. Consequently, other things being
equal, employee representations to management may be less influential in the
governance of the workplace.
The declining allegiance of employees to unions is amply illustrated by
the decline in membership since the early 1980s, presented in Appendix Table
A1. Between one-fifth and one-quarter of current non-members said they
used to be a union member, a proportion that has not differed greatly since
the early 1980s (Appendix Table A4). This indicates that unions are not losing
members at a greater rate in the 1990s than they were in the 1980s. However,
there is evidence that they are less successful in attracting new members
(Machin, 2000). Consequently, the proportion of employees who have never
been union members has risen from 28 per cent in 1983 to 44 per cent in
1998. Could it be that membership levels have fallen as employees perceive
unions as increasingly ineffectual? This might not be surprising given the
evidence presented above on managerial attitudes to unions in the 1990s. In
fact, the evidence is that employees do not regard unions as increasingly
ineffectual. As Table 3 indicates, among employees in unionised workplaces,
there has been no decline in perceptions of union effectiveness as measured
by whether employees think the union is doing its job well or not.
3. THEORETICAL LINKS BETWEEN ASPECTS OF UNIONISATION AND
EMPLOYEE PERCEPTIONS OF WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE
In this section we outline some of the mechanisms by which unions may influ-
ence employee perceptions of workplace governance, review some of the
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empirical evidence, and set out the hypotheses tested in the remainder of the
paper.
There are at least three routes by which unions may positively influence
employees’ perceptions of workplace governance as conceived in our opening
paragraph. First, unions may influence employees’ perceptions by operating
as an effective check on management, making it more accountable to its
employees for the actions it takes. Aware that employees will seek redress
through the union against arbitrary or unfair managerial behaviour, employ-
ers are more likely to adopt formal procedures (Millward et al., 2000:
156–157) and to abide by them. As a consequence, employees may view their
management as more responsive and more competent, and view the employee
relations climate more positively, where unions are present.
Secondly, unions may influence employee perceptions of the way their
workplace is governed by delivering tangible benefits to employees in the
form of better terms and conditions, or an improved working environment. If
unions secure improved wages or conditions for employees, they may feel
better about where they work, whether they attribute this to the actions of
the union or not. If they do attribute these benefits to the actions of the union
– that is, they perceive their union to be working effectively on their behalf –
the impact on perceptions of workplace governance may be greater as
employees feel ‘dual commitment’ towards union and employer, as discussed
below.
Thirdly, the union may improve employee perceptions of workplace
governance if it delivers for the employer, that is, if it can act as an effective
‘agent’ for the employer. One can see the relationship between employer and
union as a pseudo-contractual one, in which the employer (the ‘principal’ in
the contract) engages with the union as its agent in reducing the employer’s
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Table 3: Percentage of employees agreeing that union is doing its job
well, 1983–1998
Cell percentages
Year  1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1996 1998
All 60 63 57 61 62 57 61 61 58 55 59 62
Members 63 67 61 64 66 63 63 63 60 61 64 67
Non-members 51 52 49 53 52 42 56 56 55 42 50 55
Wtd base 522 475 516 933 837 819 728 724 681 843 825 753
Unwtd base 531 493 530 945 864 848 753 694 628 790 763 714
Source: BSAS. Based on responses to the question: ‘On the whole, do you think (trade union(s)/staff
association(s) at this workplace do(es) its job well or not?’ % of ‘yes’ responses calculated on base
including ‘Don’t knows’. Base is employees working 10 or more hours per week in workplaces with a
recognised union or staff association.
costs in maintaining and enforcing desired levels of worker effort. From this
perspective, it makes little sense for employers to render unions ineffectual,
since unions require influence if they are to deliver the co-operation of
workers.
With these mechanisms in mind, we turn to the hypotheses which form
the basis for our subsequent investigation.
First hypothesis: Employees’ perceptions of workplace governance are
better where there is a balance of power between unions and manage-
ment at the workplace. The reduced power of unions since the 1980s
will have led to deterioration in perceptions of workplace governance
in the presence of unions.
Union effects on workplace governance are uncertain, a priori, because they
may have offsetting influences on workplace relations arising from their dual
function in bargaining on behalf of members for improved pay and conditions,
on the one hand, and in representing the ‘voice’ of workers to management on
the other. The pursuit of their members’ economic goals through the deploy-
ment of their monopoly power may result in conflict and discord, and a
perception that management is not performing well. However, if management
concedes to better terms and conditions in the face of union bargaining power,
this may make employees more inclined to view their workplace climate more
positively. But again, if the process of negotiation results in discord, or if
constraints on management’s ability to work efficiently promote employee
perceptions of managerial incompetence, this may colour employee perceptions
of the climate in spite of the better conditions they enjoy.
By giving ‘voice’ to workers’ concerns and grievances, and by helping to
represent those concerns and grievances to management, unions may signifi-
cantly increase worker motivation and organisational commitment. In turn,
this may improve perceptions of good workplace governance and contribute
to collaborative management–employee relations (Freeman and Medoff,
1984). However, unions will only be able to operate as an effective ‘voice’
where they have sufficient authority in the workplace to act as a legitimate
representative of workers. Where unions represent a minority of workers,
they may lack influence over sections of the workforce. Consequently, their
ability to work constructively with employers may be hampered by their
inability to deliver worker support for change. Equally, their ability to disrupt
production is diminished. These considerations may explain why employers
are less likely to listen to the union if only a minority of employees back it
than if the union represents a majority voice – even where the employer has
chosen to recognise the union (Cully et al., 1999: 105–106).
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Certainly, genuine co-operation between management and employees
seems unlikely if the latter have no access to independent sources of power to
represent them and protect their interests. For example, Marshall (1992)
argues that co-operative relations cannot be maintained where there is a
substantial power imbalance between management and unions because the
stronger party will opt for unilateral control over co-operation. Unions need
to be ‘strong enough’ to influence employer and employee perceptions of the
union’s legitimacy in representing workers’ interests, predisposing them to
take greater account of what the union is saying. While weak unions may be
unable to wield monopoly power, they may also be unable to act as an effec-
tive voice for employees. So the employee relations climate might well be
relatively poor in the presence of weak unions.
In short, we might anticipate that workplace governance is viewed most
positively where unions are neither too strong nor too weak. There is already
some empirical work that confirms this expectation. Assessing managerial
perceptions of the employee relations climate, Fernie and Metcalf found that
the climate ‘is worse where the strong and weak versions of unionisation
exist than it is in non-union workplaces or those with middling union
strength’ (1995: 401). However, analyses of employee perceptions of the
employee relations climate using WERS98 provide mixed evidence on the
impact of union strength. Perceptions of climate were poorer in unionised
workplaces than in non-unionised workplaces, ceteris paribus (Bryson and
Wilkinson, 2001). They were still poorer where unionised workplaces had an
on-site lay union representative, where we would expect unions to have a
stronger ‘voice’ and greater organisational strength.7 Similarly, they were
poorer where a high proportion of workers were union members.8 However,
there was little to indicate that climate is best where there is a balance of
power between unions and management.
Below, we test whether these findings from WERS98 hold among employ-
ees using another 1998 data set, BSAS98, and a similar climate measure. But
we extend the analysis to other measures of workplace governance and estab-
lish whether the impact of union strength has changed over time. Our
hypothesis is that, since an increasing percentage of employees believe unions
have ‘too little power’ in the workplace relative to management, the average
union effect on employee perceptions of workplace governance will have
deteriorated since the late 1980s. However, where employees believe the
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7 See Millward et al., 2000, and Bryson and Wilkinson, 2001, for a discussion of this link.
8 In their analyses of WERS98, Scholarios et al. (1999) also show a negative association
between higher union density and employee perceptions of employee relations, ceteris paribus.
Their dependent variable is a composite measure incorporating employee perceptions of
management/employee relations and employee perceptions of management.
balance of power is ‘about right’, we expect perceptions of workplace gover-
nance to remain good.
Second hypothesis: Employees’ perceptions of workplace governance
are better where management actively support union membership, and
are poorest where management actively discourages membership.
Furthermore, the decline in managerial support for union membership
where unions are recognised will have led to deterioration in percep-
tions of workplace governance in the presence of unions since the
1980s.
There is little reason to believe that unions can deliver a harmonious employee
relations climate alone. What management says and does is likely to matter
just as much. The acts or omissions of one party may be able to sour employee
relations, but no matter how constructive a union wishes to be, or how strong
it may be organisationally, a co-operative environment is likely to require
that management engages constructively with the union, and vice versa. Only
then can the ‘space’ for collaboration (or what is sometimes termed ‘concer-
tation’ (Hyman, 1997: 323)) be created. In this sense, ‘the extent to which a
union is a liability or an asset [for the employer] depends crucially on how
management responds to it’ (Freeman and Medoff, 1984: 5).9 Thus, a co-
operative environment is likely to require that management engage
constructively with the union, unless it can devise non-union employee
involvement strategies that mean the union is not seen as an issue at all.
Managerial support for a union, strong or otherwise, may signal employer
interest in the concerns of workers, a signal which may lead to more positive
attitudes to management.
We hypothesise that employees’ perceptions of workplace governance are
best where management supports union membership, and are worst where
management discourages membership. Bryson and Wilkinson’s (2001) analy-
sis of matched employer–employee data from WERS98 broadly supports this
contention. Where management said they recommended union membership
to their employees, and where employees thought their management was ‘in
favour’ of union membership, employees’ perceptions of the employee
relations climate were more favourable, all things being equal. Where
employees thought management was ‘not in favour’ of union membership (as
opposed to being in favour or neutral), climate was poorer. However, not all
the evidence pointed in the same direction. The survey asks the main manager
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9 Similar arguments apply to other workplace outcomes such as financial performance. Thus,
the behaviour of one party may be responsible for poor financial performance but, as Denny
and Muellbauer (1988: 6) argue: ‘it is not the independent effect of trade unions but the inter-
action of unions and management that can cause improved economic performance’.
responsible for employee relations at the sampled workplace about manage-
ment’s attitudes towards union membership, a question mirroring the one put
to employees. When this information was matched into the employee data,
employees only viewed climate as better when the managerial respondent
said that union membership was ‘not an issue’. It may be that employers
make union membership a ‘non-issue’ where they adopt alternative policies
for consultation and communication.
Again, we test whether these findings from WERS98 hold among employ-
ees in BSAS98, extending the analysis to other measures of workplace
governance, and establishing whether the impact of managerial support for
unions has changed over time. Our hypothesis is that the decline in manage-
rial support for union membership where unions are recognised will have led
to deterioration in perceptions of workplace governance in the presence of
unions since the 1980s. However, where managers continue to be supportive
of unions, we anticipate positive perceptions of workplace governance in the
1990s, as in the 1980s.
Third hypothesis: Employees’ perceptions of union effectiveness are
positively associated with employee perceptions of good workplace
governance.
When management recognises a union for bargaining purposes, it offers
unions the opportunity to influence workplace outcomes. The degree to which
unions can actually affect those outcomes depends upon the effectiveness
with which they can capitalise on such opportunities.
According to Deery et al. (1995), the perception that a union is effectively
protecting and advancing its members’ interests can result in positive percep-
tions of the employee relations climate. The authors equate union
effectiveness with ‘union instrumentality’, defined as ‘the degree to which the
union achieves the valued goals of employees’ (Deery et al., 1995: 9). Deery
and colleagues suggest that ‘where a union is perceived to be more effective
or instrumental in achieving valued goals for its members it could be hypoth-
esised that those employees would hold more positive attitudes about the
industrial relations climate’ (Deery et al., 1995: 4). The paper provides empir-
ical evidence in support of this contention based on a large automotive
manufacturer in Australia.10 However, research by the same team in a large
government utility in Australia found that the union and employer ‘could
10 Boxall and Haynes (1997: 571) argue that unions can ‘satisfy worker needs in a neo-liberal
environment only through a successful engagement with employers. Putting the point
negatively, a union that understands worker needs, but can’t shift employer behaviour, is
ineffective.’
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most appropriately be seen as being in competition for the commitment of
their organisational members’ (Deery et al., 1994: 594). 
Furthermore, ceteris paribus, union commitment was significantly
reduced when employees perceived the employee relations climate as positive.
This prompts the authors to suggest that ‘adversarial relationships actually
underpin a number of the aspects of union commitment’ (Deery et al., 1994:
593). Deery et al. (1999: 535) seek to account for these divergent findings in
terms of ‘the strategies and actions of management and union officials’. They
suggest that the ‘critical determinant of the relationship between employee
relations climate and organisational and union outcomes may be the role that
each party plays in delivering particular benefits to employees’ (op. cit.).
Although union instrumentality may influence perceptions of climate by
engendering greater employee allegiance to both the union and the employing
organisation (‘dual commitment’), thus resulting in more co-operative and
harmonious management–employee relations, this is not the only mechanism
by which union instrumentality may improve perceptions of workplace gov-
ernance. It may also occur because perceptions of union effectiveness are
associated with perceptions of a fairer, more challenging and satisfying work
environment. This, in turn, can positively influence perceptions of the
employee relations climate (Deery et al., 1999: 546).
Bryson and Wilkinson (2001) present evidence of the association between
employees’ perceptions of union effectiveness and the employee relations
climate using WERS98. They use two proxies for union effectiveness, namely
whether employees thought unions at their workplace took notice of
members’ problems and complaints, and perceptions of whether ‘unions are
taken seriously by management at this workplace’. They found that both
measures of effectiveness were positively associated with better perceptions of
climate, ceteris paribus.
Gallie et al. (1998: 72–86) find that employees perceive supervision to be
tighter, and technical and bureaucratic methods of management control to be
more evident where unions are perceived as having greater influence. The
authors suggest that ‘a reasonable inference, then, is that intensive control
systems were preferred by organisations where managerial power was
contested’ (Gallie et al., 1998: 85). It may be that, where unions contest ‘the
terrain’ with management, employee perceptions of the working environment
actually deteriorate, in which case perceptions of the employee relations
climate may also deteriorate. This line of reasoning cautions against a simple
assumption that effective unionism will translate into better climate.
We hypothesise that employees’ perceptions of union effectiveness are
positively associated with employee perceptions of good workplace govern-
ance. Some of our measures of union effectiveness are similar or identical to
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those used in WERS98, so we can compare results for 1998 across the two
data sets. We also have repeat cross-section data on how well employees
thought unions were doing their job. By this measure, there is no obvious
trend in employees’ perceptions of union effectiveness since the early 1980s
(see Table 3). This implies that union effects may be relatively stable over
time, even if the balance of power in the workplace has shifted towards
management, as employees seem to think (Table 1). On the other hand, the
impact of union effectiveness may change over time, even though union effec-
tiveness has not varied significantly over the period, if the link between
positive (negative) perceptions of climate and effective (ineffective) unions
has strengthened over time.
4. DATA
Our data are the British Social Attitudes Surveys for the period 1983–1998.
A survey has been conducted for each year over the period, except 1988 and
1992. The survey is carried out to the highest technical standards and yields
a representative sample of adults aged 18 or over living in private households
in Great Britain (see Jowell et al., 1999 for details). We exploit the data to the
full with analyses for the whole period coupled with cross-sectional analyses
of a special 1998 trade union module containing particularly rich informa-
tion on union-related issues (Bryson, 1999). Our analyses are restricted to
employees working at least ten hours per week, a cut-off used to filter respon-
dents on questions relevant to employees. With weighting to account for
complex survey design, survey results can be generalised with confidence to
the population of employees in Britain working at least 10 hours per week.11
The full data set comprises almost 17,000 employees.
Relative to other data sets, BSAS has very extensive data on employees’
attitudes to issues that may also affect their perceptions of workplace gov-
ernance, as well as extensive information on the socio-economic
characteristics of individuals and their households. However, one difficulty in
relying wholly on employee data gathered as part of a general attitude survey
is that information on workplace characteristics is necessarily limited, even
though in our case it is more complete than is true of most individual level
surveys. Thus, for example, we have no information on union density; that is,
the proportion of employees at a respondent’s workplace who belong to a
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11 Our sample is not directly comparable with the employee sample in WERS98 because the
BSAS analyses are based on employees working at least 10 hours per week, a threshold which
does not apply in WERS98. Furthermore, WERS98 only contains employees working in
workplaces with at least 10 employees, whereas there is no such lower threshold in BSAS.
union. Nor do we have information on some features of workplace participa-
tion, consultation and representation, such as the existence of joint
consultative committees, which are known to affect perceptions of the
employee relations climate (Cully et al., 1999). That said, our analyses are
able to draw on many of the factors shown to be significant in analyses of the
WERS, together with other factors, such as information about respondents’
political attitudes, which WERS did not collect.12
Another problem with relying purely on the accounts of individual
employees about features of their workplace is measurement error due to
incomplete knowledge. In particular, non-union members have a lower
awareness of the presence of unions at their workplace. Appendix Table A5
uses matched employer–employee data from WERS98. It shows lack of
awareness about unions was widespread: one in ten union members in
workplaces with recognised unions said there was no union present, as did
24 per cent of non-members in workplaces with recognised unions. Where
employees are unaware of a union, it is likely that the union is less effective
than in a workplace where employees are aware of its presence, so we should
bear this in mind when interpreting the results.
Measures of workplace governance
We present analyses of employees’ perceptions on three aspects of workplace
governance: the employee relations climate; treatment of employees and
unions by management; and managerial performance. Others have used
composite indexes when analysing employee perceptions of workplace gov-
ernance (Dastmalchian, Blyton and Adamson, 1989; Guest et al., 1999;
Scholarios et al., 2000). Although there are advantages to moving away from
reliance on a single-item scale, we have chosen to analyse each item separately
because our aim is to understand the relationship between unionisation and
these three conceptually distinct aspects of workplace governance.
For each we have repeat cross-section data available for most or all years
including 1998, plus some measures only available in the special 1998 module
referred to above.
The climate of employee relations: Our main indicator of the employee
relations climate is the response to the question: ‘In general, how would you
describe relations between management and other employees at your
workplace?’ The question has been asked in each survey since 1983. Most
20 / Alex Bryson
12 WERS98 relies on a relatively short self-completion questionnaire, whereas BSAS data are
based on a lengthy face-to-face interview supplemented by self-completion data.
employees in Britain view relations between management and other employ-
ees at their workplace to be good, with roughly half saying they were ‘quite
good’ and another quarter considering them ‘very good’.13 However, there
has been a deterioration in employees’ perceptions of climate since the begin-
ning of the series (Appendix Table A6). The trend is apparent among
employees in non-unionised and unionised workplaces, but throughout the
period perceptions of climate have been poorer among employees in unionised
workplaces (Appendix Tables A7 and A8 respectively).
Our second measure of the employee relations climate, only asked of
employees completing a self-completion questionnaire in the 1998 survey, is
based on responses to the statement: ‘At my workplace, management and
employees are always at loggerheads’. Almost two-thirds of employees
disagreed with this statement, the percentage being a little higher in non-
unionised workplaces than in unionised workplaces (Appendix Table A9).
Management’s treatment of employees and unions: Our main indicator of
management’s treatment of employees is asked of employees completing a
self-completion questionnaire in the 1998 survey. It is based on responses to
the statement: ‘Managers at my workplace usually keep their promises to the
employees’. Almost half of employees agreed with this statement, but they
were less likely to do so if they worked in a unionised workplace (Appendix
Table A10).
The only repeat cross-section data available in BSAS regarding employ-
ees’ perceptions of the way management treats employees is how strongly
they agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Management will always try to get
the better of employees if it gets the chance’. This is available for each year
since 1985, except 1997. Over that period, around six in ten employees
agreed or agreed strongly with the statement, but there is no strong trend
(Appendix Table A11). Although we analyse this measure, it relates to
employees’ perceptions of management in general, rather than management
at their own workplace. It may therefore tell us more about the respondent’s
general attitude to management rather than circumstances at their workplace,
so it is not ideal for our purposes.
BSAS98 provides our measure of the way in which management treats
unions at their workplace. Where employees said there was a union or staff
association present at their workplace they were asked how strongly they
agreed or disagreed with the statement that ‘the trade unions (staff associ-
ation(s)) at my workplace are usually ignored by management’. One-fifth (21
13 Although the question is virtually identical to the question asked of employees in WERS98,
the pre-coded responses are different, so that results are not directly comparable (Bryson and
Wilkinson, 2001).
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per cent) agreed or agreed strongly, with 54 per cent disagreeing or disagree-
ing strongly.14
Perceptions of managerial performance: We have a single measure of employee
perceptions of managerial performance, available throughout the series. It is
based on responses to the question: ‘In general, would you say your workplace
was very well managed, quite well managed or not well managed?’ Over the
series, just over a quarter of employees say ‘very well managed’, a half ‘quite
well managed’ and one-fifth to one-quarter ‘not well managed’ (Appendix
Table A12). However, employees have become more critical of management
since the early 1980s on this measure.
Measures of trade unionism
Union strength: Throughout the series employees were asked whether there
was a union or staff association recognised ‘for negotiating pay and condi-
tions of employment’ at their workplace. Union recognition for pay
bargaining purposes is the basis for union influence in the workplace.
Although rights to represent members in grievance procedures and other
matters, and rights to negotiate over non-pay issues are important in building
a membership base and allow unions some influence over workplace matters,
these rights rarely exist without the right to negotiate over pay (Millward,
1994: 30–33). Since payment is generally regarded as ‘the most conspicuous
focus of collective concern for labour’ (Brown et al., 1998: 123), unions
which are not recognised for pay bargaining purposes can only address issues
of peripheral interest to workers collectively. For all years except 1998, this is
our only measure of union presence at the respondent’s workplace (other
than the individual respondent’s union status).15 In those years, we are there-
fore unaware of unions that may be present but are not recognised for pay
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14 This measure is the obverse of the WERS98 measure based on employee responses to the
statement that ‘unions are taken seriously by management at this workplace’, discussed in
Section 3.
15 See Appendix Table A2 for the trend in union recognition as indicated by BSAS. Concerned
that respondents may not fully understand the meaning of the phrase ‘recognised by the
management for negotiating pay and conditions’, BSAS98 asks those who said there was a
recognised union or staff association ‘Can I just check, does management recognise these
unions or staff associations for the purposes of negotiating pay and conditions of employment?’
Of the 714 unweighted cases saying ‘yes’ to the first question, 24 said ‘no’ to the check
question and 14 said ‘don’t know’. Using the weighted data, this adjustment reduces the
percentage of employees saying they worked in a workplace recognising unions from 48.8 per
cent to 46.0 per cent. Since the check question was not asked in earlier BSAS we use the
unadjusted data to retain consistency.
bargaining. However, in 1998, to identify instances where unions were
present but not recognised, those responding negatively to the question were
asked: ‘Are there any trade unions or staff associations that are active at your
workplace?’
This second question gives us a measure of non-recognised unions. We
would expect recognised unions to be stronger than non-recognised unions,
because recognition is a clear indication that the union has a formal role in
representing workers in pay and conditions negotiations, a role that has been
legitimised by the employer. In addition, there is a very strong association
between union recognition and union density which a number of studies have
shown to be the most significant indicator of union strength and influence
(Cully et al., 1999). There is a clear indication of the differences in union
strength across recognised and non-recognised unions in Appendix Table
A13, which shows that employees believe recognised unions are less likely to
be ignored by management. We use this distinction between recognised, and
active but non-recognised unions in our cross-sectional analyses for 1998.
Another indicator of union strength available only in 1998 is the presence
of a worker representative at the workplace. Those in workplaces with unions
or staff associations were asked: ‘Do you know who the (union/staff associ-
ation) representative is at your workplace or is there not one based where
you work?’
Similarly, those in non-unionised workplaces were asked whether there
were any other worker or staff representatives at their workplace and, if so,
whether they knew whom the representative was. The presence or otherwise
of a representative is a good proxy for the organisational strength of a union
on the ground. There is an association between the presence of an on-site
representative and higher union density. Moreover, the presence of a repres-
entative indicates at least some organisational capacity on the ground. We
can therefore assume that, on average, union strength is greater in workplaces
with an on-site representative than it is in those without an on-site represen-
tative.16
Furthermore, WERS98 provides evidence that worker representatives are
attaching increasing importance to ‘dealing with problems raised by the treat-
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16 The industrial relations literature draws important distinctions between lay representatives
of unions and paid officials of unions based on-site. The British Social Attitudes data make no
distinction, but we can assume that paid officials are confined to the largest workplaces and
constitute only a small proportion of the representatives identified in our data. On-site worker
representation is not the only means by which workers in multi-site organisations may be
represented. In one-third of workplaces with 25 or more employees with recognised unions
but no on-site representative, there is access to a representative based at another workplace in
the organisation (Cully et al., 1999).
ment of employees by management, and to resolving disputes’ (Cully et al.,
1999: 201), as opposed to the more ‘traditional’ activities of maintaining
wages and benefits. If they are effective in this role, we might expect the
presence of representatives on-site to contribute to more positive perceptions
of workplace governance.
Our repeat cross-section data on union strength are the data presented in
Table 1 above relating to employees’ perceptions of union power at their
workplace in 1989 and 1998.
Management support for union membership: Our measure of management
support for union membership is the data contained in Table 2 for 1989 
and 1998.
Analysts have frequently used management support for union member-
ship as a measure of union strength, sometimes combining it with the
incidence of the closed shop since the recommendation of union membership
by management may not differ substantially in practice from closed shop
arrangements (Wright, 1996). However, management endorsement is an
ambiguous measure of union strength because, although it may assist in the
recruitment of members, thus strengthening a union, it may be a sign that a
union is not wholly independent of management, and may even be reliant on
management support for its position. Therefore, union strength and manage-
ment support for a union are conceptually different. A union may be strong
without management support. Where it is strong in the face of management
opposition, the employee relations climate may be conflictual. Where it is
strong and has management support, climate may be better.
Union effectiveness: We use three measures of union effectiveness based on
questions asked of employees working in workplaces with unions or staff
associations present. All are ‘evaluative’ in that they seek to measure directly
the contribution of the union or staff association to the workplace.
Our repeat cross-section measure, available for all BSAS except 1995 and
1997, is employee perceptions as to whether the union is doing its job well,
presented in Table 3 above.
We supplement this with two measures available only in 1998. The first
is whether respondents agreed or disagreed that ‘union(s)/staff association(s)
at your workplace take notice of members’ problems and complaints’.17
Union members are more positive about the union’s responsiveness to
employees’ needs than non-members while, not surprisingly, more non-
members simply don’t know how effective the union is (Appendix Table A14).
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17 The wording and scaling of this question are virtually identical to the WERS98 measure
discussed in Section 3.
The second measure of union effectiveness only available in 1998 is the
extent to which workers agree or disagree with the statement that their union
or staff association ‘makes things run more smoothly at work’. Rather than a
measure of the extent to which unions deliver for individual workers, this
question is an indication of another mechanism by which unions might effect
a better employee relations climate, namely by simply contributing to the
better running of the workplace. The measure indicates one reason as to why
the presence of unions might contribute to an improved employee relations
climate, thereby making it easier to make inferences as to which is cause and
which effect. Two-fifths of workers agree or strongly agree that unions make
things run more smoothly, with union members more likely to say so than
non-members (Appendix Table A15).
Individual union membership: It is a standard finding in the British and
American literatures that unionised workers express greater dissatisfaction
with management than non-unionised workers (Freeman and Medoff, 1984;
Gallie et al., 1998; Bryson, 1999; Bryson 2000). Freeman and Medoff offer
an explanation for this in the greater politicisation of unionised workers.
They suggest that unionised workers are more prone to express their voice
‘loudly’ to ensure that it is heard, resulting in ‘voice-induced complaining’
(1984: 142) which they distinguish from ‘true’ dissatisfaction.18 They also
suggest that ‘some of the critical attitude of union workers is due to their
greater awareness of problems and willingness to speak out’ (1984: 142). As
Gallie et al. (1998: 113–114) point out: ‘unionism as an oppositional form of
representation may highlight organisational inefficiencies and colour percep-
tions of management competence’. In addition, as Freeman and Medoff note
(1984: 141), ceteris paribus, the stock of dissatisfied workers will be greater
in unionised workplaces because dissatisfied workers are less likely to quit in
unionised workplaces than they are in non-unionised workplaces (Bryson and
McKay, 1997).
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18 Evidence in support of ‘voice-induced complaining’ among union members comes from
studies showing that, although union members have poorer perceptions of workplace
governance than non-members, they also have lower quit rates (Freeman and Medoff, 1984:
142; Gallie et al., 1998: 113–116; Cully et al., 1999: 273–274). We tested this proposition using
BSAS98 by comparing individuals’ perceptions of the employee relations climate with their
perceptions of whether they were likely to quit their jobs voluntarily over the next year. If union
members were more prone to ‘voice-induced complaining’, we would expect the association
between the perception of a poor climate and expected quit rates to be weaker among union
members than it is among non-members. In fact, the evidence does not support the proposition.
Our data confirm that union members have the expected lower quit rates. But the association
between the likelihood of a voluntary quit and poorer perceptions of the employee relations
climate at the workplace was just as strong among union and non-union members (both were
significant at a 99 per cent confidence level).
It is therefore important to control for individual union membership
status, since we wish to distinguish perceptions of workplace governance
associated with individual union membership from ‘workplace effects’ associ-
ated with the unionisation of the workplace. This is discussed further in
Section 5. We identify union members by responses to the question: ‘Are you
now a member of a trade union or staff association?’
Control variables
Our analyses control for a wide range of individual, job and workplace-
related characteristics to minimise estimation bias arising from omitted
variables. To allow for comparability across models, we use the same sets of
controls for our dependent variables whenever possible. Our baseline
estimates for the period 1983–1998 use controls which are available for every
year. However, as noted below, some data are only available for a sub-set of
years. In these instances, we test the sensitivity of results to the inclusion and
exclusion of these additional controls for the years where they are available.
Some controls are only available for 1998, which is why, when we present
analyses for the 1998 cross-section, our baseline model is different from the
1998 equivalent in the time-series.
Appendix Table A16 defines the variables and shows their incidence in
the pooled repeat cross-section data and Appendix Table A17 does the same
for the 1998 cross-section. We introduce these controls below, with the excep-
tion of the union variables discussed above.
Demographic characteristics of respondents: Our analyses incorporate gender,
age and ethnicity, all of which have been associated with employee percep-
tions of management in previous studies (Bryson and McKay, 1997; Gallie et
al., 1998; Bryson and Wilkinson, 2001). More highly educated workers often
have higher expectations of involvement, and may therefore be particularly
critical of management where participation is denied. We therefore include
individuals’ highest educational qualification in analyses of the period
1985–1998 (BSAS did not collect these data in 1983 or 1984).
Job-related characteristics: In our repeat cross-section analyses we control for
two aspects of individuals’ jobs: their occupational class (based on the Hope-
Goldthorpe schema) and whether or not they were working part-time.19 We
incorporate years working continuously with the current employer in our
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19 Part-time status is based on respondents’ self-definition. In the 1998 cross-sectional analysis
we replace this with a categorical variable identifying hours. It is not possible to use this
variable in repeat cross-section analysis because the question wording was changed in 1996 to
distinguish between total hours worked and contractual hours worked. Prior to 1996 the
question did not make the distinction, so it is not possible to construct a consistent time-series.
In addition, hours worked were not collected in 1983.
analyses of the 1998 cross-section to capture individuals’ attachment to their
workplace.20
Workplace-related characteristics: As noted earlier, one difficulty in relying
wholly on employee data gathered as part of a general attitude survey is that
information on workplace characteristics is necessarily limited. Nevertheless,
we are able to control for industrial sector and workplace size,21 both of
which have been significantly associated with employee perceptions of
workplace governance in recent studies (Bryson and Wilkinson, 2001; Bryson,
2000). Bryson and Wilkinson (2001) show that the determinants of employee
perceptions of the employee relations climate differ markedly across the
public and private sectors. So we use information on whether the workplace
is publicly or privately owned to perform separate analyses on employees’
perceptions in the public and private sectors.
Attitudes: Some have argued that ‘attitudes to work and to trade unions can
be formed from experiences both inside and outside the workplace’ (Deery
and Walsh, 1999: 263) and that patterns in employees’ attitudes may be attrib-
uted, not only to aspects of their employment relationship but to ‘differences
in personal underlying values’ (Cully et al., 1999: 165). Some of these experi-
ences may be captured, in part, by demographic characteristics. However,
BSAS also contains direct measures of the value set that employees bring with
them to work. We test the sensitivity of our results to the incorporation of this
value set using the BSAS left-right index, available since 1986. The index,
based on general attitudes to distributive justice, helps control for differences
across individuals which are not directly related to their work experiences, but
which may affect their orientation to work.22
20 These data were only collected from 1991 onwards, so do not appear in the repeat cross-
section analyses. As noted earlier, this variable may be endogenous with respect to perceptions
of workplace governance since those least satisfied with their situation are likely to leave.
However, we retain it in our analyses to control for the union effect in raising average tenure.
Thus our results are net of union effects in increasing the stock of dissatisfied workers arising
from the fact that unions raise tenure.
21 Data on workplace size are not available in the 1983 survey.
22 The left-right scale is an additive index drawing on responses to five statements to which
the respondent is invited to ‘agree strongly’, ‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree’ or
‘disagree strongly’. These are: ‘Government should redistribute income from the better-off to
those who are less well off’; ‘Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers’; ‘Ordinary
working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth’; ‘There is one law for the rich
and one for the poor’; ‘Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the
chance’. This well tried and tested index measures an underlying (‘latent’) attitudinal dimension
relating to employees’ perceptions of distributive justice. Those with lower scores on the
continuous scale running from 1 to 5 are more likely to favour government economic interven-
tion and the reduction of inequality than are those with higher scores. Union members are
significantly more likely to be ‘left-wing’ (have a lower score) on the index than non-members,
and there is a strong and significant association between being on the ‘left’ of the index and
negative perceptions of the employee relations climate (Bryson, 1999).
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Research has established strong associations between individuals’
attitudes towards aspects of their own job – pay, job security, their say at
work – and perceptions of governance at their workplace (Bryson and McKay,
1997; Deery et al., 1995; Dastmalchian et al., 1989). Those viewing their
own position more (less) favourably are likely to view their working environ-
ment more (less) favourably. It may even be that the effects of unionisation
on perceptions of governance are themselves mediated through satisfaction
with the job and terms and conditions. However, although analysts frequently
include individuals’ perceptions of their own jobs in models estimating
perceptions of workplace governance, it is not possible to discern the direc-
tion of causation in cross-sectional analyses. So it is not really possible to
‘explain’ perceptions of workplace governance by reference to employees’
satisfaction with their own situation (although the latter may explain some of
the variance in the former). We therefore omit employee attitudes towards
their own work situation from our analyses.23 However, it seems reasonable
to link employee perceptions of general conditions at their workplace with
their perceptions of climate and management. In particular, there is a well-
developed literature linking perceptions of distributive justice at the
workplace with perceptions of the employee relations climate. BSAS contains
a useful question on distributive justice at the workplace: ‘Thinking of the
highest and lowest paid people at your place of work, how would you
describe the gap between their pay, as far as you know?’24 We test the sensi-
tivity of our results to the inclusion of this variable in our 1998 analyses.
Region: We group data from the ten standard regions into seven regions,
separately identifying Greater London. These identify where the employee
lives, rather than where the workplace is located.
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23 It may be that union effects are mediated by factors such as employees’ perceptions of the
say they have at work. If unions influence perceptions of ‘say at work’, and thus perceptions of
workplace governance, then part of the union effect is mediated by perceptions of the say
employees think they have. However, if it is assumed that organisational practices such as
union recognition influence ‘say’, but not vice versa, then the intermediate variables can be
omitted from the model without biasing estimates of the total effects of unionisation on percep-
tions of governance.
24 If employees are unable to distinguish between their own situation and the workplace
situation, this measure would not be particularly useful. In fact, although there was a 
correlation between lower wages and a belief that the workplace pay gap was too large, it was
not particularly strong (one-tailed Spearman’s Rank coefficient 0.147, p<.000).
5. ANALYSIS
The sample
Our sample are employees working 10 hours or more taken from BSAS
between 1983 and 1998. As well as cross-sectional analyses for 1998, which
use the richer data available in the special trade union module for that year,
discussed earlier, we run repeat cross-section analyses where the data are
available.
Others have confined their analyses of employees’ perceptions of
workplace governance to non-managerial employees, perhaps because
managers are overwhelmingly positive in their assessment of governance as
they lie on one side of the management–employee line, while non-managerial
employees lie on the other (Cully et al., 1999: 276–283). We adopt an alter-
native approach, analysing the perceptions of all employees with non-missing
data. After all, most managers experience ‘being managed’ or supervised.
Our models include occupational controls to account for more positive
perceptions further up the occupational hierarchy.
Modelling procedures
The outcome variables discussed in Section 2 are all categorical indicators
defined in terms of ordered responses. We use ordered probit estimators to
model the relationship between these dependent variables and sets of
independent variables. In ordered probits, an underlying unobservable score
is estimated as a linear function of the independent variables and a set of
unknown ‘threshold’ parameters, or cut points. The probability of observing
outcome i corresponds to the probability that the estimated linear function
plus random error is within the range of the cut points estimated for the
outcome.
All models are run on data weighted by the inverse of the respondent’s
sampling probability. As well as allowing the results to be generalised to the
population from which the sample is drawn, the use of probability weights
also guards against estimation bias which can arise through differential
sample selection probabilities.25 We employ the Huber-White robust variance
estimator that produces consistent standard errors in the presence of
heteroscedasticity. This procedure uses pseudo-likelihood methods, the point
estimates being those from a weighted ‘likelihood’ which is not the distribu-
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25 Differential sampling fractions can result in standard estimator biases (Skinner, 1997). The
weights account for all variation in sampling probabilities, thus eliminating differential
sampling probability as a possible source of estimation bias.
tion function for the sample. Thus, standard likelihood-ratio tests are not
valid (Skinner, 1989; STATA Manual, Release 6, Volume 4, 1999).
Time and business cycle
One of our main objectives is to identify changes in union effects over the
course of the BSAS series. To do this, we pool our cross-sections and interact
union variables with time. In most analyses, we capture time with dummies
for each year. However, when controlling for business cycle effects we revert
to a linear trend.26 We use the unemployment-vacancy ratio in each year to
control for business cycle effects.27
Tackling limitations to the analysis
Unionisation is not randomly distributed across individuals or workplaces. If
there are what Freeman and Medoff (1984: 23) term ‘pre-union differences’
between unionised workplaces (or individuals) and non-unionised workplaces
which are unobserved or unobservable that sort them into or out of unionised
status, and these differences are correlated with the outcome of interest, then
estimates of union voice effects will be biased. As Freeman and Medoff put it:
‘This uncaptured “pre-union difference” may explain part of the outcome
difference that we attribute to unionism’ (1984: 23). It is possible to account
for these selection processes by modelling the likelihood that an individual is
a union member, or works in a unionised workplace. However, in this paper
we have simply incorporated a wide range of factors that we know influence
employee perceptions of management to minimise the problem of omitted
variables bias. We also test whether our findings hold across sub-samples
where we might expect systematic differences in the association between
unions and perceptions of management (within the unionised and non-
unionised sectors, the public and private sectors, and among union members
and non-members).
The cross-sectional nature of our data presents a second difficulty, namely
the direction of any causal link between unionisation and employee percep-
tions of workplace governance. Unionisation may even be endogenous if it is
a response to perceptions of management. For instance, employees may
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26 Occasionally we also include non-linear time dummies alongside the linear trend to account
for non-linear trends. In the pooled repeat cross-section with linear time and business cycle
controls, employee observations are not independent of one another, because they are clustered
according to the year of interview. We adjust our estimates accordingly to obtain accurate
standard errors.
27 We experimented with three measures capturing business cycle effects: the unemployment
rate (the number defined as unemployed according to the ILO definition divided by the total
economically active), the employment rate (the total in employment and self-employment
divided by the total of working age) and the unemployment–vacancy ratio.
become union members because employee relations are poor at their
workplace. Similarly, an employer may grant union recognition to assuage
workers complaining of poor treatment by their employer. In these cases, our
results may overstate the negative impact of membership and recognition on
perceptions of workplace governance. Although endogeneity problems may
be tackled through instrumentation, we do not attempt this here. Instead, we
simply point to the relative durability of union recognition (Millward et al.,
2000: 120–121). This gives us some confidence that measures of workplace
unionisation pre-date individuals’ perceptions of management at the time of
the survey interview. The problem may be more serious when considering
individual union membership status since, as noted earlier, many non-
members report being union members in the past.28 In recognition of this, as
well as running separate models for members and non-members, we test the
sensitivity of results to the inclusion and exclusion of individual union
membership status. We also try to account for some of the underlying differ-
ences between members and non-members that are unobservable in most data
sets by testing the sensitivity of our results to interactions between union
membership and individuals’ underlying value set as measured by our left-
right scale, discussed above.
6. RESULTS
In this section, we present results from the multivariate analyses described in
Section 5.29 This section is split into three, dealing with three areas of
workplace governance in turn: the employee relations climate; management’s
treatment of employees and unions; and managerial performance. Each sub-
section follows the same format. First, we present evidence for the 1998
cross-section, assessing the average effect of unions, followed by analyses
incorporating union strength, management support for unions, and union
effectiveness in ‘delivering’ for workers. Then we establish whether these
union effects have changed over time, using pooled repeat cross-section data.
Employee perceptions of the employee relations climate
We begin our investigation of employee perceptions of workplace governance
with analyses of employees’ responses to the question: ‘In general, how would
you describe relations between management and other employees at your
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28 See Cappelari, Lucifora and Piccirilli (2000) for a good example of how to account for the
endogeneity of individual union status.
29 Full models are available from the author on request.
workplace?’ Responses are scored along a four-point scale from ‘very good’
to ‘not at all good’. Descriptive information presented in Appendix Tables A7
and A8 shows that employees in unionised workplaces had poorer percep-
tions of the employee relations climate than employees in non-unionised
workplaces throughout the BSAS series. In 1998, employees in non-unionised
workplaces were twice as likely to say their climate was ‘very good’. To estab-
lish whether there is a truly independent association between unionisation
and perceptions of climate we ran ordered probit models, as described in
Section 5 (page 29), which enable us to hold constant a range of factors while
analysing the relationship between unionisation and climate. Our dependent
variable runs from 0 (‘very poor’) to 3 (‘very good’) so negative coefficients
indicate poorer perceptions of climate.
Appendix Table A18 presents six models for all employees in employment
in 1998. Model (1) contains a union recognition dummy only, and confirms
that employees perceive climate as poorer in the presence of recognised unions.
Earlier we suggested that, by providing effective ‘voice’ for workers’ concerns,
the presence of an on-site worker representative might improve employees’
perceptions of the employee relations climate. In practice, the presence of an
on-site worker representative is associated with poorer perceptions of climate
(model (2)), supporting findings using WERS98 (Bryson and Wilkinson, 2001).
The introduction of an on-site worker representative dummy substantially
reduces the union recognition coefficient, although this remains large and
significant.
As noted earlier, the richness of the BSAS98 data permits us to distinguish
between recognised unions, recognised staff associations, and unions that are
not recognised for pay bargaining. When making this distinction, we find
that poorer perceptions of climate were only apparent in the presence of a
recognised union (model (3)). Recognition for bargaining purposes per se is
not associated with poorer perceptions of climate; rather, it appears to be
something that applies only to recognised unions. The fact that it applies to
recognised unions, as opposed to unions which have no bargaining power,
suggests that the bargaining power of the union is a key factor. This union
recognition effect is robust to the inclusion of controls for demographic
characteristics, qualifications, the nature of the job, type of employer, and
region (model (4)).30 However, the effect of on-site worker representation is
no longer statistically significant.
As expected, union members had significantly poorer perceptions of the
employee relations climate than employees who had never been members
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30 This specification is the product of much experimentation. Squared terms for age and job
tenure were rejected on the basis of Wald tests for joint significance.
(model (5)). The perceptions of staff association members and ex-union
members were not significantly different from those of ‘never members’. The
inclusion of union membership status substantially reduces the size of the
union recognition coefficient, making it statistically insignificant. The fact
that the union membership effect appears to dominate the workplace union
recognition effect might suggest that the union recognition effect in model (4)
is simply picking up the more critical attitude of union members, who tend to
be concentrated in unionised workplaces. Model (6) seeks to distinguish
between the ‘membership effect’ and ‘workplace effect’ by distinguishing
between employees according to their membership status and whether they
worked in a unionised workplace. If there is a ‘membership effect’, then union
members should have poorer perceptions of climate than non-members,
holding workplace recognition constant. If there is a ‘workplace effect’, those
working in workplaces with recognised unions should have poorer percep-
tions of climate than those who are not, holding membership constant.
Model (6) confirms the significance of workplace and membership
effects. Employees working in workplaces with recognised unions and on-
site representation had significantly poorer perceptions of the employee
relations climate than the reference category, namely non-union members
working in workplaces without union recognition and without an on-site
worker representative.31 This was so whether they were union members or
not, confirming the presence of a union workplace effect. However, union
recognition was not associated with poorer perceptions of climate in the
absence of on-site representation. If we accept on-site representation as a
proxy for organisational strength, this indicates that the negative effect of
unionisation was confined to stronger unions.32
Among employees working in unionised workplaces with on-site rep-
resentation, the perceptions of union members were significantly poorer than
the perceptions of non-members, confirming the presence of a ‘membership
effect’ as well.33
We tested the sensitivity of these findings on union membership to the
incorporation of the BSAS left-right index, discussed in Section 4 (page 27).
The index, based on general attitudes to distributive justice, helps control for
31 An adjusted Wald test confirms the joint significance of the eight-way variable based on
union recognition, on-site representation and individual union membership (F(7, 1410) = 2.97,
Prob > F = 0.0043).
32 This is confirmed by a simpler model which replaces the eight-way variable with one distin-
guishing no recognition, recognition with no on-site representative, and recognition with on-site
representation. The recognition effect without on-site representation was not significant (–0.05,
t=0.38) but recognition with on-site representation was negative and significant (–0.23, t=2.43).
33 The coefficient is –0.196, t=1.96.
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differences across individuals which are not directly related to experiences of
their own workplace, but which may affect their orientation to work. Those
with lower scores on this index are more likely to favour government
economic intervention and the reduction of inequality than are those with
higher scores. Not surprisingly, union members were significantly more likely
to be left-wing, that is to have a lower score, than were non-members.34
Furthermore, there was a strong and significant association between being on
the ‘left’ of the index and negative perceptions of the employee relations
climate. When added to Model (5) in Appendix Table A18 the index was
significant (0.24, t=4.16). The union membership coefficient fell a little but
remained significant at a 90 per cent confidence level. We also interacted a
dummy variable identifying those scoring below the median on the index
with the union membership variables. Both main effects were negative and
significant (union membership –0.33, t=2.58; low-scorers on the index –0.28,
t=2.98), but the interaction was positive and insignificant. So the union
membership effect holds, having controlled for individuals’ value sets.
We also tested the sensitivity of our union membership finding to employ-
ees’ perceptions of distributive justice at their workplace using the pay gap
question described in Section 4 (page 28). As anticipated, those viewing the
gap between the lowest and highest paid as ‘too big’ or ‘much too big’ had
poorer perceptions of the employee relations climate. However, the union
membership effect remained strong with its introduction into Model (5) of
Appendix Table A18.35 Its interaction with union membership status also
made no significant difference to our results (the main effect for union
membership being –0.26, t=1.99, and the pay gap effect being –0.46, t=5.48:
the interaction was positive and insignificant).
Finally, we split our sample into employees working in the private and
public sectors. We find that the effects identified in the whole sample model
are confined to the public sector (Appendix Table A19). Model (6) replicates
Model (6) in Appendix Table A18, but for the public sector only. It confirms
that perceptions of climate were poorer among employees in workplaces with
recognised unions and on-site worker representation, whether the employee
was a union member or not. Although the coefficient for members is larger
than the one for non-members, it is not significantly so. Model (3) is the same
model for the private sector: there are no union effects.
34 / Alex Bryson
34 Union members’ mean score was 2.38, compared to 2.58 for non-members (F=25.53,
p<0.000).
35 The pay gap dummy was significant (–0.44, t=6.30) but the union membership effect
remained significant (–0.21, t=2.16).
In conclusion, in our whole sample models, there is a clear union member-
ship effect whereby union members had poorer perceptions of climate than
non-members. However, there is also a ‘workplace effect’ whereby recognised
unions were associated with poorer perceptions of the employee relations
climate. This workplace effect was only apparent in the presence of an on-site
worker representative, that is, where unions were organisationally strong.
Separate sectoral analyses reveal that the effect is confined to the public sector.
To give some idea of the size of these union effects we calculate changes
in the estimated probability of having good or poor climate for employees in
unionised and non-unionised workplaces arising from infinitesimal change in
each independent, continuous variable, and for switches in the value of
discrete variables.36 Relative to a union non-member in a workplace with no
recognised union and no on-site worker representative, a union member in a
workplace with a recognised union and on-site worker representative was 7.8
per cent more likely to report employee relations that were ‘not very good’,
while a non-member in similar circumstances was 4.2 per cent more likely to
do so, ceteris paribus.
Perceptions that management and employees were at loggerheads in 1998
It is possible that perceptions of the employee relations climate were poorer in
the presence of unions because their role in representing workers, either in pay
negotiations or grievance procedures, occasioned a more adversarial environ-
ment. If this were so, we might expect to pick this up through employees’
responses to the statement: ‘At my workplace, management and employees are
always at loggerheads’. We ran identical analyses to those reported above for
our measure of management–employee relations. Without controls, union
recognition was associated with an increased perception that management and
employees at the workplace were always at loggerheads (0.16, t=2.34).
However, once controls were added, this effect disappeared. Nor were there
any effects associated with other measures of worker representation or union
membership. This remained the case in our separate analyses for the public
and private sectors. It seems unlikely, then, that perceptions of a poorer
employee relations climate in the presence of recognised unions with on-site
representation were due to a more adversarial environment.
36 These marginal effects are generated from Model (6) in Appendix Table A18 using Tamas
Bartus’s MARGIN program for STATA. I thank him for providing me with the program. The
marginal effects are calculated using the delta method. Rather than computing the marginal
effects at the means of the variables or at values specified by the user, ‘MARGIN’ calculates the
average of partial and discrete changes over the observations. Taking the average of discrete
changes enables a straightforward interpretation of marginal effects for dummy variables. See
Tamas Bartus’s MARGIN.HLP file for further details.
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Union power and the employee relations climate in 1998
We can directly test our hypothesis that employee perceptions of climate are
better where there is a balance of power between unions and management at
the workplace with responses to the question: ‘Do you think that the (trade
union/staff association/trade union or staff association) at your workplace
(has/have) too much or too little power?’37 Descriptive analyses appear to
confirm the hypothesis (Bryson, 1999). To establish whether there was an
independent association between perceptions of union power and climate we
replaced our ‘objective’ measures of unionisation in Appendix Table 18 with
the union power variable, retaining the same set of control variables. The
results are presented in Appendix Table A20.
Model (1), run for our whole sample, shows that those who thought that
their workplace union or staff association did not have enough power had a
less favourable view of their employee relations climate than those without a
union or staff association at their workplace, and a less favourable view than
those who thought the union had the right amount of power.38 As antici-
pated, there was no significant difference between the perceptions of those
who thought that their workplace union had the right amount of power and
those who worked in a non-unionised environment. Contrary to expecta-
tions, climate was not poorer in the small number of cases where unions were
thought to have ‘too much power’.
The same finding emerges from an analysis based on the unionised sector
alone (Model (2) in Appendix Table A20). Where unions were perceived as
having ‘too little power’, the employee relations climate was perceived as
significantly poorer than where unions were perceived as having the ‘right
amount’ of power. The finding also holds irrespective of union membership
status, as indicated by the results in Models (3) and (4), which are run on
members and non-members in the unionised sector respectively. This is in
spite of the fact that perceptions of union power differed across members and
non-members (Bryson, 1999). The findings also hold for the private and
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37 The question was asked of all those with a union or staff association at their workplace,
whether it was recognised for pay bargaining or not. See Bryson (1999) for a discussion of the
relationship between ‘objective’ union measures of strength and employee perceptions of union
strength. Table 1 is restricted to instances in which the union or staff association was
recognised for pay bargaining because this restriction applied in 1989. For modelling purposes,
we collapse the two categories distinguishing those who thought unions had ‘too much power’
or ‘far too much power’ due to small sample sizes for the latter. Those who said ‘Don’t know’
or did not answer are represented by the TUPOWMIS dummy variable.
38 The marginal effect of having a union with too little power, relative to having no union at
all, is to increase the probability of having a climate that is ‘not very good’ by 8.9 per cent.
public sectors (models (5) and (6) respectively), though the size of the effect is
more pronounced in the public sector.39
Our analysis can not identify the direction of causation. It is plausible
that people view unions as lacking power because employee relations at their
workplace are poor, rather than vice versa. But the central point is that weak
unions appear to be bad for employee relations. Where the power balance
between union and employer is perceived to be about right, unions need have
no adverse effect on the employee relations climate. In this sense, the ‘power’
effect brings unionised workplaces into line with non-unionised workplaces.
This is an important finding since, as we noted at the outset, some have
argued that the government’s new statutory recognition procedure may result
in an increase in the number of weak unions with recognition.
Did the attitudes of management to union membership influence the
employee relations climate in 1998?
Our measure of managerial attitudes to unions, presented in Table 2, is avail-
able for employees in unionised and non-unionised workplaces. The
multivariate analyses presented in Appendix Table A21 support the
contention in our second hypothesis that employees’ perceptions of climate
were better where employees said management supported union membership,
and were poorest where they said management discouraged membership.
Relative to employees who said management’s attitudes to unions were ‘not
an issue’ at the workplace, those who said management ‘encourages trade
union membership’ were significantly more likely to view climate positively,
whereas those who said that management ‘discourages trade union member-
ship’ had significantly poorer perceptions of climate (Model (1)).40 This was
so controlling for a range of factors, including workplace union recognition
and individual union membership, both of which were independently associ-
ated with poorer perceptions of climate. The effects of managerial attitudes
to unions are apparent when confining the analysis to employees working in
unionised workplaces (Model (2)) and when the analysis is run on members
and non-members separately within unionised workplaces (Models (3) and
(4) respectively). They also hold in the private and public sectors (Models (5)
and (6) respectively).
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39 We added our ‘objective’ measures of worker representation (UNIREC, SAREC, ACTIVE,
REP) to the models presented in Appendix Table A20. Across all six models, perceptions of
employee relations were significantly better where unions were perceived as having the right
amount of power relative to instances in which they were thought to have too little power.
40 The marginal effect of discouraging membership relative to membership not being an issue
is to increase the probability of having a climate that is ‘not very good’ by 11.9 per cent.
Employees were asked about the attitudes of management to union
membership even where there were no unions present. Once again, percep-
tions that employers were discouraging union membership were detrimental
to the employee relations climate.41
We tested whether the effects of management attitudes to union member-
ship differed according to the strength of the union by interacting
management attitudes with a union variable distinguishing between recogni-
tion with and without on-site worker representatives. There were no
significant interactions, indicating that the effects of management support
held for both stronger and weaker unions.42
These findings are important for two reasons. First, the multivariate
analyses challenge earlier descriptive findings (Bryson, 1999) which suggested
two routes to good employee relations, namely encouragement of union
membership and ensuring that membership was ‘not an issue’. Ceteris
paribus, encouragement of membership was associated with better climate
compared to instances in which membership was not seen as an issue, whether
the employee was a union member or non-member, worked in a unionised or
non-unionised environment, and whether the employee worked in the public
or private sector. Secondly, despite delivering a better employee relations
climate, union encouragement was a route pursued by small minority of
employers (Bryson, 1999). Thus the results present something of a puzzle:
why is it that managers do not adopt a more positive stance towards union
membership, especially where they are already in place? And why is it that
management often opposes union membership, incurring the costs of poorer
climate as a result?
Did the influence of unions on the employee relations climate in 1998
depend on their effectiveness?
The multivariate analyses support the contention in our third hypothesis that
perceptions of union effectiveness are positively associated with perceptions
of better climate. Appendix Table A22 presents results using our first measure
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41 Relative to employees who said that employer attitudes to union membership were ‘not an
issue’, those who said membership was discouraged had a significantly poorer perception of the
climate at their workplace (–0.62, t=4.56). Encouragement was positively signed but not signifi-
cant (0.87, t=1.52).
42 We were concerned that employees’ responses to the question about managerial attitudes to
unions might simply reflect their broader political views about the value of union representa-
tion and the behaviour of employers, rather than the actual views of management at their
workplace. So we checked for a link between responses on the management attitudes question
and their value set, as measured by the ‘left-right’ index discussed earlier. There was no such
association. Furthermore, an interaction between scores on the ‘left-right’ scale and perceptions
of management’s attitudes to unions was not significant in estimating employee perceptions of
climate.
of union effectiveness, namely whether employees thought the union was
doing its job well or not at the workplace. It is the measure presented in Table
3. Our models distinguish those who said ‘yes’ from those who said ‘no’, as
well as identifying those who said they did not know the answer to the
question. Perceptions of climate did not differ significantly between those
working in a workplace without a union or staff association, and those
working in a workplace with a union doing its job well. However, where
employees thought their union or staff association was not doing its job well,
perceptions of climate were significantly poorer (Model (1)).43 Among those
in unionised workplaces, the association between poorer perceptions of
climate and unions not doing their job well was stronger (Model (2)), and
held for union members and non-members alike (Models (3) and (4) respec-
tively). Separate sectoral analyses revealed that perceptions of climate in the
private sector did not differ across employees in unionised and non-unionised
workplaces, irrespective of how well unions were seen to be doing their jobs
(Model (5)). However, perceptions of climate were significantly poorer among
those in unionised workplaces where the union was perceived to be doing its
job poorly, than they were among those with a union doing its job well (–0.26,
t=2.04). In the public sector, perceptions of climate were poorer in the
presence of unions, whether they were perceived to be doing their job well or
not, although perceptions were significantly poorer where unions were not
doing their job well (Model (6), 0.55, t=3.76).44
Employee perceptions of the employee relations climate were also influ-
enced by employee perceptions of union responsiveness to union members’
problems and complaints. Using an identical set of control variables to those
presented in Appendix Table A22, we replaced the measure of how well unions
did their job with dummy variables measuring union responsiveness to
members’ problems and complaints. Our model distinguishes those agreeing
that unions did take notice of members’ problems and complaints, those who
disagreed, those who neither agreed nor disagreed, and those who did not
know.45 Perceptions of climate did not differ significantly between those
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43 The marginal effect of a union not doing its job well, relative to having no union at all, is to
increase the probability of having a climate that is ‘not very good’ by 7.6 per cent.
44 On introducing the objective measures of worker representation, the association between
poorer perceptions of climate and a union not doing its job well remained strong and signifi-
cant among employees in unionised workplaces, whether they were union members or not.
However, differences between employees in unionised and non-unionised workplaces were no
longer significant.
45 See Appendix Table A14 for a description of the question asked and the distribution of
responses. For the purposes of modelling, we grouped those agreeing strongly and those agree-
ing into a single category, and we did the same with those disagreeing strongly and those
disagreeing.
working in a workplace without a union or staff association, and those working
in a workplace with a union that was viewed as responsive to members’ needs.
However, where employees disagreed that the union took notice of members’
problems and complaints, perceptions of climate were significantly poorer.46
Not surprisingly, among those in unionised workplaces, the association between
poorer perceptions of climate and unions not being responsive was only signif-
icant for union members.
A similar picture emerges with our third measure of union effectiveness,
based on responses to the statement that the union or staff association ‘make
things run more smoothly at work’ (see Appendix Table A15 for the distribu-
tion of responses). Adopting an identical technique to the one described in
the last paragraph, we found perceptions of climate did not differ signifi-
cantly between those working in a workplace without a union or staff
association, and those working in a workplace with a union that was viewed
as contributing to the smooth running of the workplace. Where employees
disagreed that the union assisted in the smooth running of the workplace,
perceptions of climate were significantly poorer.47
Union effects on employee perceptions of the employee relations climate
over the period 1983–1998
Now we turn our attention to changes in union effects on climate over the
fifteen years to 1998. We do this by running ordered probit regressions on
pooled repeat cross-section data, interacting union variables with time, as
discussed in Section 5 (page 29). We are unable to replicate the 1998 model
specifications for earlier years because they are not so rich in information about
unionisation. However, information on union recognition, union membership,
perceptions of union strength and effectiveness, and management attitudes to
union membership are present for years other than 1998, allowing us to test
our three hypotheses (see Section 4, page 22, for a discussion).
Appendix Table A23 presents models estimating changes in perceptions of
the employee relations climate over the period 1983–1998, with time indicated
by year dummies with the reference category being the start of the series, 1983.
Model (1) without controls confirms the descriptive analysis (Appendix Table
A6) in showing a deterioration in perceived climate over the period. The trend
is more apparent on introducing the union recognition dummy, which is itself
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46 The marginal effect of a union not taking notice of members’ problems and complaints,
relative to having no union at all, is to increase the probability of having a climate that is ‘not
very good’ by 10.3 per cent (t=3.94).
47 The marginal effect of a union not assisting in the smooth running of things, relative to
having no union at all, is to increase the probability of having a climate that is ‘not very good’
by 8.6 per cent (t=4.0).
negative and significant (Model (2)). However, interactions between the year
dummies and union recognition show no obvious trend, without controls or
with controls (Models (3) and (4) respectively). The union recognition main
effect remains strong and significant, though the coefficient is smaller once we
account for union membership status (Model (5)).48 Identical separate analy-
ses for union members and non-members, and employees in unionised and
non-unionised workplaces, confirmed that the deterioration in perceptions of
climate held across all these groups of employees.
Although none of the interactions between union recognition and year
dummies is statistically significant, the interaction terms were jointly signifi-
cant.49 So in Appendix Table A24 we alter our specification. Models (1) to
(3) use a linear time trend, which shows a deterioration in climate over time.
In Model (2), both union recognition and the linear time trend are negative
and significant, but the interaction between the two is positive and signifi-
cant, indicating an amelioration of the underlying negative union effect on
climate over time. However, the interaction becomes insignificant on the
introduction of controls (Model (3)).
The trend in Appendix Table A23 is non-linear, with perceptions of
climate deteriorating in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. So, in Models (4) to
(6) in Appendix Table A24 we incorporate a dummy for a non-linear time
trend after 1990. In Model (5) the post-1990 dummy is interacted with union
recognition. The linear time trend remains significant, with the post-1990
dummy negative, though weakly significant, indicating that there was a
deterioration in perceptions of climate in the 1990s relative to the 1980s.
However, the interaction term is positive and significant, suggesting that
perceptions of climate worsened more rapidly in the 1990s among those in
non-unionised workplaces. With controls added, the coefficient falls slightly
but remains significant at a 90 per cent confidence level (Model (6)).50
The finding is confirmed when we run separate models for employees in
unionised and non-unionised workplaces. Using the same set of control
variables as those in Appendix Table A23, we find the linear trend is negative
and significant for those in unionised workplaces (–0.024, t=4.53) but
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48 Sensitivity analyses included the incorporation of workplace size, qualifications and the left-
right scale. These controls were not available for all years (see Section 4, page 26) so that
reference years varied. However, the main union recognition effect remained significant and,
although some interactions between union recognition and year dummies were significant, there
was no obvious trend in the union effect over time.
49 In Model (4) the adjusted Wald test confirms their joint significance. F(13, 16479) = 2.23,
F=0.0065.
50 These findings were unaffected by business cycle controls described in footnote 31, which
were usually insignificant or weakly significant. Broadly similar results to those in Appendix
Table A24 were obtained when using a post-1992 dummy instead of a post-1991 dummy.
insignificant for those in non-unionised workplaces (–0.002, t=0.20). The
post-1990 dummy, by contrast, is negative and significant for those in non-
unionised workplaces (–0.25, t=1.96) but insignificant for those in unionised
workplaces (–0.002, t=0.05). This indicates that perceptions of climate
deteriorated in a broadly linear way over the period for employees in
unionised workplaces whereas, among those in non-unionised workplaces,
climate deteriorated significantly in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. We can
conclude that the pattern of decline was somewhat different for employees in
unionised and non-unionised workplaces, but that climate nevertheless
declined for both sets of employees over the period.
Have union effects on climate differed with union strength over time?
In our first hypothesis, we suggested that the reduced power of unions since
the 1980s may have led to a deterioration in perceptions of workplace gov-
ernance in the presence of unions. Our findings above indicate that, although
perceptions of climate deteriorated during the 1990s among those in
unionised workplaces, this deterioration was, if anything, a little less
pronounced than among those in non-unionised workplaces. This is not
consistent with the possibility that the weakening of unions in the 1990s (see
Table 1) had increased the rate of decline in perceptions of climate in
unionised workplaces. However, it may be that reductions in union power
fed through to perceptions of climate in ways we did not anticipate. As noted
earlier, we have data on employees’ perceptions of union power at their
workplace for 1989 and 1998 only. Using the same set of controls as in
Appendix Table A24, we interacted perceptions of union power with a 1998
dummy. The results confirmed the findings presented in Section 6 (page 36),
with perceptions of climate being significantly poorer among employees who
thought the union had too little power, relative to those who worked in a
non-unionised environment. Perceptions of climate were poorer in 1998 than
in 1989. However, interactions between perceptions of union power and the
1998 dummy were not significant. These findings held when we ran separate
analyses for the public and private sectors, and for union members and non-
members in unionised workplaces. This suggests that, although there may
have been a decline in union power at the workplace over the period, it had
no bearing on employees’ perceptions of employer–employee relations, and
cannot explain deteriorating perceptions of the employee relations climate
since then among those in unionised workplaces.
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Have union effects on climate differed with changing management attitudes
to union membership?
We conducted a similar exercise to establish whether the hardening attitude
of management to unions, illustrated in Table 2 and indicated in other
research discussed earlier, may have contributed to deteriorating perceptions
of climate. We pool the data for the only two years in which we have data on
employee perceptions of management attitudes to union membership, namely
1989 and 1998. The findings replicate those presented in Section 6 (page 37)
for 1998, showing employer discouragement of union membership was detri-
mental to climate, while encouragement of union membership was associated
with better climate. But interactions between the 1998 dummy and manage-
ment attitudes to union membership were not significant. According to the
BSAS data in Table 2, employees only perceived a hardening of employer
attitudes to unions where they were working in unionised workplaces.
However, the results were no different when the analysis was confined to
employees in unionised workplaces.51 So, although management discourage-
ment of union membership was associated with poorer perceptions of climate,
their greater propensity to discourage membership by 1998 did not contribute
to the deterioration in perceptions of climate between 1989 and 1998.
Has the impact of union effectiveness on climate differed over time?
Finally in this section, we turn to the impact of union effectiveness over time,
as measured by whether employees thought unions were doing their job well
or not. As discussed in Section 3, the impact of union effectiveness may
change over time, even though union effectiveness has not varied significantly
over the period (Table 3), if the link between positive (negative) perceptions
of climate and effective (ineffective) unions has strengthened over time. In
fact, we found no evidence of changes in the impact of union effectiveness
over the period 1983–1998.
Summary of union effects on employee perceptions of the employee relations
climate
In 1998, employees working in unionised workplaces had a poorer perception
of the employee relations climate than those working in non-unionised
workplaces, ceteris paribus. The effect was specific to unions, as opposed to
staff associations, and in particular to unions recognised by employers for pay
bargaining. This indicates that the effect was related to situations in which
employers bargained with worker representatives over pay. However, further
Union Effects on Workplace Governance / 43
51 The findings also held when running analyses separately for employees in the public and
private sectors.
investigation revealed that the effect was confined to employees working in
workplaces with a recognised union and a worker representative on-site. This
might indicate that the effect was confined to unions that were organisation-
ally strong. When we directly tested the effect of employee perceptions of
union power at the workplace, we found that, where employees thought the
power balance between union and employer was right, unions had no adverse
effect on climate. This finding confirms Marshall’s (1992) theory, discussed
earlier, and confirms other empirical research using WERS98 (Bryson and
Wilkinson, 2001). The adverse effect of unions was confined to situations in
which employees thought unions were too weak. Contrary to expectations,
climate was not poorer in the small number of cases where unions were
thought to have too much power. This raises some doubts about interpreting
the negative effect of on-site worker representation as an organisational
strength effect. These effects held across union membership status and having
accounted for employees’ value set with the ‘left-right’ scale.
Employers can influence employee perceptions of the employee relations
climate through their attitude to unions. Where they are supportive, percep-
tions of climate are better; where they oppose it, climate is poorer, whether
the employee is a union member or not, works in a unionised or non-
unionised environment, or in the public and private sectors.
Similarly, unions can influence perceptions of climate through their
behaviour. As other research has indicated (Bryson and Wilkinson, 2001),
unions are best for employee relations where they do their job well, where
they have regard to their members’ concerns, and where they contribute to
the smooth running of the workplace. In these circumstances, perceptions of
climate are not significantly different from those in similar non-unionised
workplaces. Conversely, where unions are viewed as ineffective, climate is
poorer than in comparable non-unionised workplaces.
Repeat cross-section analyses showed that employee perceptions of
climate deteriorated over the period 1983–1998. The pattern of decline was
somewhat different for employees in unionised and non-unionised
workplaces, with the decline in the 1990s more pronounced among employ-
ees in the non-unionised sector. There was no evidence that union strength,
employer attitudes to unions, or perceptions of union effectiveness were
associated with changes in perceptions of climate.
Employee perceptions of management’s treatment of employees and
unions
This section explores factors associated with trust in management, and
management’s preparedness to engage with employee representatives.
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Our main focus is employees’ perception that ‘managers at my workplace
usually keep their promises to the employees’, available only in BSAS98. It is
plausible that, by holding employers accountable to their employees for the
actions they take, unions may increase the likelihood of employees agreeing
with this statement. In fact, descriptive analyses show employees in
workplaces recognising unions for pay bargaining were less likely to agree
with this statement than employees in non-unionised workplaces (Appendix
Table A10). Of course, there may be many reasons for this association. It
may simply reflect value sets of unionised workers, who may be more critical
of management per se, regardless of their own workplace circumstances. It
may arise through the politicisation of unionised workers resulting in ‘voice-
induced complaining’, or a heightened awareness of managerial shortcomings
due to the information available to unionised workers. It may arise because
longer workplace tenure, associated with greater dissatisfaction at work, is
associated with unionisation. All of these possible causes were discussed in
Section 4 (pages 22 and 26), and we seek to account for them in our multi-
variate analyses. It is also possible that the association arises because unions
find a foothold among poorer employers where bad employment practices
provide unions with a basis for organisation. We control for a range of
employer characteristics, but we cannot ascertain whether poor management
came before unionisation or not. We can only point to the relative durability
of unionisation and assume that our union measures pre-date employee
perceptions of workplace governance at the time of interview (see Section 5,
page 29, for further discussion).
To establish whether there is a truly independent association between
unionisation and perceptions that management keep their promises to employ-
ees, we ran ordered probits on the measure described in Appendix Table A10.
Our dependent variable runs from 0 (‘strongly disagree’) to 4 (‘strongly agree’)
so that negative coefficients indicate stronger disagreement with the statement
that management ‘usually keep their promises to employees’.
Appendix Table A25 presents six models for all employees in employ-
ment in 1998. Without controls, union recognition was associated with an
increased perception that managers do not keep their promises (Model (1)).
The negative effect of on-site worker representation accounts for some of the
union effect (Model (2)). The effect is confined to recognised unions, as
opposed to recognised staff associations (Model (3)). However, the effect is
not significant with the inclusion of control variables (Model (4)). As antici-
pated, union members were less likely to trust managers than non-members
(Model (5)). Model (6) distinguishes between union members in workplaces
with and without union recognition. Compared to the reference category,
non-members in non-unionised workplaces, members in recognised
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workplaces were less likely to think managers kept their promises, but the
effect was only weakly significant. However, there was a clear membership
effect among employees working in unionised workplaces: union members
were less likely to think that managers kept their promises.52
When added to Model (5) in Appendix Table A25, the left-right index
was positive and significant (0.27, t=4.10), indicating that those who were
more ‘rightward’ leaning were more inclined to trust managers. Furthermore,
its introduction reduced the union membership coefficient to insignificance.
When interacted with union membership, the dummy variable identifying
low scorers on the index was negative and significant (–0.25, t=2.76), whereas
the union main effect and interaction were not significant. This is strong
evidence that employees’ trust in management was accounted for in part by
their broader perspectives on distributive justice, and not purely through their
work experiences. Nevertheless, perceptions of distributive justice at the
workplace also mattered, since those viewing the gap between the lowest and
highest paid as ‘too big’ or ‘much too big’ were less inclined to trust manage-
ment to keep their promises.53
Running separate analyses for employees in the private and public sectors
shows membership and workplace effects differed across employees in the
two sectors. In the private sector, perceptions that management kept their
promises were not associated with features of worker representation. But
union members were less likely than non-members to think management kept
their promises, whether they worked in a workplace with a recognised union
or not. In the public sector, membership effects were absent, but trust in
management was lower in the presence of a recognised union, and particu-
larly low where there was union recognition but no on-site representative.54
We can conclude from this analysis that perceptions that managers keep
their promises were strongly influenced by employees’ value sets, as measured
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52 Using the SVYLC option available in STATA to compute significant differences for linear
combinations of coefficients, we find that the coefficient is –0.20 with a t-statistic of 2.07. This
finding is confirmed when we ran separate models for employees in unionised and non-
unionised workplaces. The union membership effect is only significant among employees in
workplaces recognising unions (–0.26, t=2.38).
53 When introduced to Model (5) in Appendix Table A25, the pay gap dummy was significant
(–0.38, t=5.25) but the union membership effect remained significant (–0.20, t=1.95). When
interacted, both main effects were significant and the interaction was not significant.
54 Using the same controls as those used in Appendix Table A25 (with the obvious exception
of the sector dummies), trust in management was not significantly different among employees
in non-unionised workplaces and those working in workplaces with recognised unions and an
on-site representative. However, where employees worked in a unionised workplace without
on-site representation, they were significantly less likely to say that management kept their
promises (–0.49, t=2.07).
by the left-right scale, and that this goes some way to explaining the member-
ship effect identified. Workplace unionisation was associated with a more
critical attitude towards management, but only in public sector workplaces
where employees had no on-site worker representative.
Union power and employee trust in management in 1998
If unions are able to hold managers accountable to employees for their
actions, we might expect trust in managers to be lower where the union is
weak, and higher where employees believe that there is at least a balance of
power between union and employer. This hypothesis, outlined in Section 3, is
confirmed by the results presented in Appendix Table A26.
In the economy as a whole, employees in unionised workplaces who
thought the union had ‘too little’ or ‘far too little’ power, were significantly
less likely to think that managers at their workplace usually kept their
promises to employees than employees in non-unionised workplaces (Model
(1)). Where unionised workers thought the balance of power was ‘about
right’, they were significantly more likely than non-unionised workers to
think that managers kept their promises.55 Where unions were thought to
have ‘too much’ or ‘far too much’ power, trust in management was not signif-
icantly different from trust in non-unionised workplaces.
When introduced to this model, the left-right scale was positive and signif-
icant (0.23, t=3.50) but the union power effects were unaffected. This suggests
that perceptions of union power were not simply proxying the value set
employees brought with them into the workplace. The power effect was
strong in the unionised sector, for members and non-members alike (Models
(3) and (4) respectively). It was also apparent for private sector employees in
general (Model (5)). In the public sector, trust in management was not signif-
icantly different across employees in unionised and non-unionised
workplaces, regardless of perceptions of union power (Model (6)). However,
among employees in unionised public sector workplaces, weak unions were
associated with lower trust than unions with the ‘right’ amount of power
(Model (6), 0.61, t=4.50).
Did management attitudes to union membership influence employee trust in
management in 1998?
In models with identical controls to those estimating perceptions of climate in
Appendix Table A21 (which include objective measures of unionisation and
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55 The marginal effect of having a union with too little power, relative to having no union at
all, was to increase the chances of disagreeing that managers kept promises by 6 per cent,
whereas the marginal effect of having a union with the right amount of power was to increase
those chances by 6 per cent, ceteris paribus.
membership status), employees were more likely to believe that managers
usually kept their promises to employees where they also thought manage-
ment were supportive of union membership. Trust was least evident where
employees thought managers at their workplace discouraged membership.
These findings held across the private and public sectors, and within
unionised workplaces among both members and non-members. They were
also robust to the introduction of the ‘left-right’ scale. The effects were quite
large. In the whole sample model, the marginal effect of managers discourag-
ing membership, relative to viewing union membership as ‘not an issue’, was
to reduce the chances of agreeing that managers kept promises by 10.5 per
cent, whereas the marginal effect of managers encouraging membership was
to increase those chances by 14.9 per cent, ceteris paribus.
Since the question is also asked of employees in non-unionised
workplaces, we ran the model on these employees separately. Once again,
trust in management was greater where management supported union
membership, but support for membership was very rare (only six unweighted
cases). Among employees in non-unionised workplaces there was no signifi-
cant difference in trust for management between employees who thought
their managers discouraged membership and those who simply saw it as ‘not
an issue’. But where managers discouraged membership, employees were less
likely to agree that managers kept their promises than where managers were
accepting of union membership (0.45, t=2.19).
It is not immediately obvious why employees were more likely to trust
managers at their workplace where the employer actively encouraged union
membership, and were less trusting of those who discouraged membership.
One possible explanation is that management support for worker representa-
tion signals managerial openness with employees. Alternatively, managers
may be more willing to keep their side of a bargain with employees where
they are dealing with competent unions that they feel able to support –
although this does not account for the effects among employees in non-
unionised workplaces. In any event, the association between management
support for (opposition to) union membership and higher (lower) employee
trust in managers may partly explain the association between management
support for (opposition to) union membership and better (poorer) percep-
tions of the employee relations climate.
Did perceptions of union effectiveness influence employee trust in manage-
ment in 1998?
Employee perceptions of how well they thought unions at their workplace
were doing their job had similar effects on employee trust in management as
they did on perceptions of the employee relations climate. Using models with
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identical controls to those estimating perceptions of climate in Appendix
Table A22, we found that employees were less likely to believe that managers
usually kept their promises to employees where the union was thought not to
be doing a good job.56 Where unions were thought to be doing their job well,
trust in management was similar across employees in unionised and non-
unionised workplaces. These findings held in models for the whole sample,
members and non-members in unionised workplaces, and for the public
sector. In the private sector, trust did not differ significantly between employ-
ees in non-unionised workplaces and those in workplaces with ineffective
unions. However, trust in management was higher where unions were thought
to be doing their jobs well, though the effect was only weakly significant.57
Our second measure of union effectiveness, unions’ responsiveness to
members’ problems and complaints, was also associated with trust in
managers. Trust in managers did not differ significantly between those
working in a workplace without a union or staff association, and those
working in a workplace with a union that was viewed as responsive to
members’ needs. However, where employees thought the union took little
notice of members’ problems and complaints, employees were less inclined to
think that managers usually kept their promises to employees. These findings
held in our separate analyses for different groups of employees, except for
union non-members and employees in the public sector, where union respon-
siveness was not significantly associated with trust in management.
We ran identical analyses for our third measure of union effectiveness,
that is, the contribution of unions to the smooth running of the workplace.
Where unions were perceived to be contributing to the smooth running of the
workplace, employees’ trust in management was higher than where there
were no unions. Where employees disagreed with the statement that unions
were contributing to the smooth running of the workplace, trust in manage-
ment was lower than where there were no unions, ceteris paribus.58
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56 In the whole sample model, the marginal effect of having a union that was not doing its job
well relative to having no union at all, was to increase the chances of disagreeing that managers
kept promises by 5.4 per cent.
57 Relative to employees in non-unionised workplaces, the coefficient for a union doing its job
well was 0.23, t=1.82.
58 Among employees as a whole, the marginal effect of having a union which employees
thought did not contribute to the smooth running of the workplace increased the probability of
disagreeing that managers keep their promises by 6 per cent, relative to having no union. The
marginal effect of having a union which employees thought did contribute to the smooth
running of the workplace was to reduce the probability of disagreeing that management kept
promises by 4.4 per cent.
Perceptions that unions are usually ignored by management
Another aspect of the way in which management treats employees is their
attitude to collective representation of employees’ interests. In BSAS98,
employees who said there was a union or staff association present at their
workplace were asked how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the state-
ment that ‘the trade unions (staff association(s)) at my workplace are usually
ignored by management’. When we ran ordered probit models on all employ-
ees in the unionised sector, features of worker representation at the workplace
and individual union membership were not significantly associated with
responses to this statement. Not surprisingly, employees were significantly
less likely to think that managers ignored unions at their workplace where
the union had the right amount or too much power, relative to instances in
which they had ‘too little power’. They were also less likely to be ignored
where unions were thought to be doing their job well. These findings suggest
that management takes greater account of unions where their power requires
this, and where unions are operating effectively in the interests of their
members.
Union effects on managers’ treatment of employees over the period
1983–1998
As discussed in Section 4 (page 20), our only repeat cross-section data relat-
ing to perceptions of the way managers treat their employees are responses to
the statement: ‘Management will always try to get the better of employees if
it gets the chance’. Whether employees agreed or disagreed with this state-
ment may tell us more about employees’ general attitudes to management,
rather than managers at their workplace, so it is not ideal for our purposes.
Running models for 1998 using controls identical to those used in
Appendix Table A18, we find membership effects dominate, with union
members more likely than non-members to think managers try to get the
better of them, whether they worked in workplaces with a recognised union
or not. Further investigation revealed that this effect was particularly strong
where there was an on-site worker representative.
Appendix Table 27 presents pooled repeat cross-section analyses for
employee perceptions that management tries to get the better of employees.
The linear time variable alone reveals no trend (Model (1)), consistent with
the descriptive information presented in Appendix Table A11.59 However, the
time trend is positive and weakly significant once interacted with union recog-
nition, suggesting that employees were more likely to agree with the statement
over time (Model (2)). Those in workplaces with recognised unions were
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59 The data were not collected in 1983, 1984 and 1997. Data on qualifications and workplace
size were available for all the years, so they are added to the models.
more likely to agree that managers tried to get the better of employees, but
the interaction with the time trend is not significant. However, the picture
changes once controls are introduced (Model (3)). The positive time trend is
stronger and significant at a 95 per cent confidence level, but the union recog-
nition main effect is negative and significant, while its interaction with the
linear time trend is positive and significant. This indicates that, on average,
employees in unionised workplaces were less likely than those in non-
unionised workplaces to think managers tried to get the better of employees,
but that employees in unionised workplaces were increasingly likely to agree
with the statement. The effect is robust to the inclusion of the unemploy-
ment–vacancy ratio that accounts for business cycle effects (Model (5)). The
linear trend is also more precisely specified in this model. The analysis
suggests that employees were increasingly likely to think that managers will
try to get the better of employees if they get the chance. The presence of a
recognised union reduces the likelihood of agreeing with the statement,
perhaps because employees’ responses to the general statement are influenced
by their own circumstances, in which unions can effectively combat such
behaviour on the part of employers. However, the fact that employees in
unionised workplaces were increasingly likely to think managers try to get
the better of employees may signal a decline in unions’ ability to act as an
effective constraint on management.60
To assess the effect of union power directly, we introduced our union
power dummies to models with controls like those in Appendix Table A27.61
Where employees thought unions had ‘too much’ power or the ‘right amount’,
they were significantly less likely to think that managers would try to get the
better of employees than in instances in which there was no union. Where
unions were thought to have ‘too little’ power, employees were more likely to
think managers would seek to get the better of employees, when compared
with similar employees in non-unionised workplaces. These effects were
similar in 1989 and 1998, with the exception of unions having ‘too much
power’, which became statistically insignificant in 1998.
Similar analyses pooling 1989 and 1998 data showed that, ceteris
paribus, employees were most likely to think managers would try to get the
better of employees where they also thought managers at their workplace
discouraged union membership. This supports our earlier finding which
showed employees were less likely to trust managers who opposed union
membership. Effects were similar in 1989 and 1998.
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60 Because the dependent variable is one of the items which contributes to the ‘left-right’ index
we could not control for employees’ value sets using this scale.
61 Because the union power data were only available for 1989 and 1998, the linear time trend
was replaced by a 1998 dummy and the unemployment–vacancy ratio control was dropped.
Union effectiveness was also associated with perceptions of managers
trying to get the better of employees. Over the period 1985–1998, ceteris
paribus, where employees thought unions were doing their job well, they
were less likely to think that managers sought to take advantage of employ-
ees than employees in non-unionised workplaces. The opposite was the case
where unions were thought not to be doing their job well. Interactions with a
linear time trend showed employees in unionised workplaces were increas-
ingly likely to say that managers tried to get the better of employees, but this
was the case whether the union was thought to be doing its job well or not.
Summary of union effects on managers’ treatment of employees and unions
This section has shown that, where unions were present, trust in managers
was significantly higher when they had sufficient power to challenge employ-
ers, where they represented employees effectively, and where they were
supported by management. In these circumstances, trust in managers was
either higher than, or similar to, trust among employees in non-unionised
workplaces. This suggests that unions can hold managers accountable for
their behaviour, increasing employees’ belief that managers keep their
promises. However, where unions were weak, ineffective or faced manage-
ment opposition, employees were less trusting of management than where
there was no union present.
Although employees’ trust in management has diminished since the early
1980s, particularly among employees in unionised workplaces, there is little
evidence to suggest that this is associated with a diminution in union power,
managers’ attitudes to unions, or the perceived effectiveness of unions.
Employee perceptions of managerial performance
For all the reasons outlined at the beginning of Section 6 (page 45) (worker
politicisation, better information, longer job tenure, the value sets of union
members and non-members), we might expect employees in unionised
workplaces to be more critical of managerial performance than similar employ-
ees in similar non-unionised workplaces. Unions may also have direct positive
and negative effects on workplace performance as noted earlier in the paper
(for fuller accounts of the links between unions and workplace performance
see Bryson and Wilkinson, 2001; Bryson, 2001). If employees link managerial
performance with workplace performance, these union effects on workplace
performance will influence perceptions of managerial performance.
We ran ordered probits on the measure of managerial performance
presented in Appendix Table A12. Our dependent variable runs from 0 (‘not
well’) to 2 (‘very well’) so that negative coefficients indicate poorer percep-
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tions of managerial performance. Appendix Table A28 presents seven models
for all employees in employment in 1998. Without controls, union recogni-
tion was associated with poorer perceptions of managerial performance
(Model (1)), the effect being confined to recognised unions as opposed to
recognised staff associations or active unions (Model (3)). The effect remains
significant with the inclusion of control variables (Model (4)). As anticipated,
union members had significantly poorer perceptions of managerial perform-
ance than other employees (Model (5)). When individual union membership
is introduced, union recognition is no longer significant, suggesting that at
least part of the effect captured by the recognition dummy relates to union
members’ more critical attitude to management. Model (6) identifies both
membership and recognition effects. Union members in workplaces with
recognised unions had poorer perceptions of managerial performance than
other employees, ceteris paribus, including non-members in unionised
workplaces (–0.24, t=2.41). So there is a membership effect among those in
unionised workplaces. Although there is a recognition effect as well, this is
confined to union members. 
However, when we distinguish between the various combinations of
union membership, workplace recognition, and the presence of on-site worker
representatives, we find that members and non-members in workplaces with
recognition and on-site representation were most critical of how well their
workplace was managed (Model (7)). This is evidence of a union workplace
effect. However, it was confined to unionised workplaces with on-site rep-
resentation.62 But the effect for non-members was only weakly significant:
within workplaces with recognition and on-site representation, members were
more critical of management than non-members.63 So membership effects
were also apparent. These findings closely resemble those relating to percep-
tions of the employee relations climate.
Testing the sensitivity of the union membership effect to the inclusion of
the ‘left-right’ index we split union members into those with high and low
scores on the index. Ceteris paribus, only those scoring below the mean on
the index were significantly more likely to say their workplace was not
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62 This was confirmed when we simply distinguished between no recognition, recognition with
on-site representation and recognition without on-site representation. Union recognition was
only negative and significant (–0.26, t=2.65) where there was an on-site representative.
63 Relative to non-members in workplaces with recognition and on-site representation, the
coefficient for members with recognition and on-site representation is –0.24, t=2.41. The
marginal effect of being a union member in a workplace with union recognition and on-site
representation, relative to a non-member in a non-unionised workplace with no representative
on-site, was to increase the chances of believing the workplace was ‘not well’ managed by 14
per cent, and to reduce the chances of thinking it was managed ‘very well’ by 12 per cent.
managed well, relative to never-members.64 This indicates that union
members’ perceptions of managerial performance were accounted for in part
by their broader perspectives on distributive justice. However, perceptions of
distributive justice at the workplace also mattered, since those viewing the
gap between the lowest and highest paid as ‘too big’ or ‘much too big’ were
more inclined to say that the workplace was managed ‘not very well’.65
Separate analyses for employees in the private and public sectors show
membership and workplace union effects differed across employees in the
two sectors. In the private sector, union membership was not significant. The
dominant factor in determining perceptions of managerial performance was
the presence of a worker representative on-site. Using the same controls as
those in model (5) in Appendix Table A28, we added a three-way variable,
distinguishing employees in workplaces with no recognised union and no
worker representative (the reference category) from those with a recognised
union and no representative, and those with recognition and on-site represen-
tation. It showed recognition without representation was significantly
associated with better perceptions of managerial performance (0.39, t=2.17).
Recognition with representation was associated with poorer performance
(–0.20, t=1.68). This shows that it is the combination of union recognition
and on-site representation, rather than union recognition per se, which is
associated with poorer perceptions of managerial performance. This could be
an effect of union strength which, by constraining management’s ability to
manage, may result in less efficient outcomes for the workplace. Alternatively,
strong unions may have more information about the managerial process (and
thus managerial shortcomings) than weaker unions, or have the organisa-
tional capacity to mobilise workers in opposition to management actions
that, in other workplaces, may go unnoticed.
Applying the same model to the public sector, we found employees in
workplaces with recognition but no on-site representation had perceptions of
managerial performance that did not differ significantly from the perceptions
of those in workplaces without recognition (–0.31, t=1.21). However, percep-
tions were poorer where there was a combination of recognition and on-site
representation (–0.45, t=2.46). In addition, union members viewed manage-
rial performance as poorer than non-members, ceteris paribus.
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64 The coefficient was –0.46, t=3.71, whereas, relative to non-members, the coefficient for
union members scoring above the median was –0.08, t=0.57.
65 When introduced to Model (5) in Appendix Table A28, the pay gap dummy was significant
(–0.37, t=5.34) but the union membership effect remained significant (–0.24, t=2.37). When
interacted, both main effects were significant (although union membership was only significant
at a 90 per cent confidence level) and the interaction was not significant.
We conclude from this analysis that, across the economy, perceptions of
managerial performance were poorer in the presence of recognised unions, but
only in the presence of on-site representation. Perceptions of how well manage-
ment performed were influenced by employees’ value sets as measured by the
left-right scale, and this goes some way towards explaining the union member-
ship effect identified. In the private sector, union membership was not
significant, and the negative, weak effect of union recognition was confined to
instances in which there was on-site worker representation. In the absence of
on-site worker representation, there were indications that managerial perform-
ance was viewed more positively than among similar employees in
non-unionised workplaces. In the public sector, union members viewed manage-
rial performance as poorer than non-members, ceteris paribus. As in the case of
the private sector, managerial performance was viewed as poorer in the presence
of a recognised union where there was also on-site representation.
Union power and employee perceptions of managerial performance
Appendix Table A29 presents evidence of a strong association between
employee perceptions of union power at the workplace and perceptions of
managerial performance. In the whole sample model (Model (1)), perceptions
of managerial performance were significantly poorer among employees in
unionised workplaces than they were among employees in non-unionised
workplaces, but only where unions were weak.66 Where they have the ‘right’
amount of power, employees’ perceptions of managerial performance were
not significantly different from those among employees in non-unionised
workplaces, ceteris paribus. This may be because unions require a certain
degree of power to operate as effective agents for employers in delivering
better performance, or because unions can help enforce better managerial
practices, but only where they have sufficient power. The negative but
insignificant coefficient for unions with ‘too much’ power hints at the poss-
ible deleterious effects of powerful unions capable of undermining
management with their bargaining power. In the unionised sector, managerial
performance excels where unions have the right amount of power (Model
(2)), a perception held by members and non-members (Models (3) and (4)
respectively). Among employees in the private sector (Model (5)), managerial
performance was viewed more favourably where unions had the ‘right’
amount of power than it was where there was no union. Results were
somewhat different in the public sector (Model (6)), where unions were
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66 The marginal effect of having unions with too little power, relative to having no unions, was
to reduce the chances that the workplace was ‘very well’ managed by 13 per cent, and to
increase the chances that it was ‘not well’ managed by 14 per cent.
associated with poorer managerial performance than in non-union circum-
stances, whether they had ‘too little’ power or the ‘right’ amount. However,
performance was significantly poorer where unions had ‘too little’ power
than where they had the ‘right’ amount (–0.46, t=3.13).
Were management attitudes to union membership associated with
perceptions of managerial performance?
Using identical controls to those used in estimating perceptions of climate in
Appendix Table A21, employees were more positive about how well their
workplace was managed where managers were thought to be supportive of
union membership, and were most negative where managers were thought to
oppose union membership. To give an indication of the size of these effects,
the marginal effect of managerial opposition to union membership was to
increase the chances that the workplace was ‘not well managed’ by 20.7 per
cent compared to instances in which membership was ‘not an issue’.
Opposition to union membership reduced the chances of being managed ‘very
well’ by 15.3 per cent, relative to instances in which membership was ‘not an
issue’, whereas support for membership increased the chances by 13.1 per
cent. These effects were independent of union recognition (itself negative
though only significantly so in the public sector), on-site worker representa-
tion (negative and significant in the private sector, and among union members
in unionised workplaces) and union membership (itself negative and signifi-
cant). These findings held across the private and public sectors and, within
unionised workplaces, across union members and non-members.
Management opposition to union membership also had a deleterious effect
on perceptions of managerial performance among employees in non-
unionised workplaces: in separate analyses for these employees, the coefficient
for managerial opposition was 0.73 (t=5.13) relative to instances in which
membership was ‘not an issue’.
There are at least three possible explanations for these associations. First,
it may be that managerial support for unions does raise managerial perform-
ance. In earlier sections we found management support for union membership
was associated with increased trust in management and a better employee
relations climate. These are two of the mechanisms by which management
support for union membership might engender better workplace performance
which, in turn, reflects on perceptions of managerial performance. This is
consistent with the idea that a positive attitude to unions where they exist can
create an environment that is conducive to collaborative, and thus more
productive, relations at the workplace. Secondly, management orientations to
unions may come ‘after the fact’, in that they give support to unions where
they have been effective partners, and are less fulsome in their support where
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unions have not delivered for the employer. Another way of expressing this is
to say that they only support union membership when they can afford to do
so. In this case, we would not be justified in attributing a causal link between
managerial orientations to unions and managerial performance. Thirdly,
employees may simply think more favourably of managers and their perform-
ance where those managers appear supportive of worker voice.
Were employee perceptions of union effectiveness associated with
perceptions of managerial performance?
Employee perceptions of how well they thought unions at their workplace
were doing their job had similar effects on perceptions of how well the
workplace was run as they did on employee trust in management, so we will
not elaborate on them in detail. Using models with identical controls to those
estimating perceptions of climate in Appendix Table A22, employees were
more critical of managerial performance where the union was thought not to
be doing a good job.67 Where unions were thought to be doing their job well,
perceptions of managerial performance were similar across employees in
unionised and non-unionised workplaces. These findings held in models for
the whole sample, members and non-members in unionised workplaces, and
for the private sector. In the public sector, perceptions of managerial perform-
ance were significantly poorer among employees in unionised workplaces,
whether unions were doing their job well or not. However, managerial
performance was higher where unions were thought to be doing their jobs
well, compared to instances in which they were not.
The findings were almost identical when using our second measure of
union effectiveness, unions’ responsiveness to members’ problems and
complaints. Where employees thought the union took little notice of
members’ problems and complaints, employees’ perceptions of managerial
performance were less favourable than where there were no unions. Where
unions were responsive, perceptions of managerial performance did not differ
significantly from instances in which there was no union (with the exception
of the public sector, where managerial performance was viewed more
negatively).
We ran identical analyses for our third measure of union effectiveness,
the contribution of unions to the smooth running of the workplace. Where
unions were perceived to be contributing to the smooth running of the
workplace, employees’ estimation of managerial performance was no differ-
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67 In the whole sample model, the marginal effect of having a union that was not doing its job
well relative to having no union at all, was to increase the chances of saying the workplace was
‘not well managed’ by 15.4 per cent.
ent from that made by employees where there were no unions. Where employ-
ees disagreed with the statement that unions were contributing to the smooth
running of the workplace, employees thought managerial performance was
lower than where there were no unions, ceteris paribus.
Union effects on managerial performance over the period 1983–1998
Turning our attention to changes in union effects on managerial performance
over the fifteen years to 1998, we adopt techniques identical to those used in
Section 6 (page 40) to analyse perceptions of climate over time.
Appendix Table A30 presents models estimating changes in perceptions
of how well the workplace was managed over the period 1983–1998, with
time indicated by year dummies with the reference category being the start of
the series, 1983. (The model specifications are identical to those estimating
climate in Appendix Table A23.) Model (1) without controls confirms the
descriptive analysis (Appendix Table A12) in showing a deterioration in
perceived managerial performance over the period. The trend is more appar-
ent on introducing the union recognition dummy, which is itself negative and
significant (Model (2)). Interactions between the year dummies and union
recognition show no obvious trend, without controls or with controls
(Models (3) and (4) respectively). The union recognition main effect remains
strong and significant, though the coefficient is smaller once we account for
union membership status (Model (5)).68 Identical separate analyses for union
members and non-members, and employees in unionised and non-unionised
workplaces, confirmed that the deterioration in perceptions of climate held
across all these groups of employees. These findings are very similar to the
findings presented for employee perceptions of climate.
Although none of the interactions between union recognition and year
dummies is statistically significant, the interaction terms were jointly signifi-
cant.69 So in Appendix Table A31 we alter our specification. Models (1) to
(3) use a linear time trend, which shows a deterioration in managerial
performance over time. In Model (2), both union recognition and the linear
time trend are negative and significant, but the interaction between the two is
positive and significant, indicating an amelioration of the underlying negative
perceptions of managerial performance in unionised workplaces over time.
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68 Sensitivity analyses included the incorporation of workplace size, qualifications and the left-
right scale. These controls were not available for all years (see Section 4, page 26) so that
reference years varied. However, the main union recognition and union membership effects
remained significant. Interactions between union recognition and year dummies were never
significant.
69 In Model (4) the adjusted Wald test confirms they are on the margins of being jointly signifi-
cant. F(13, 17144) = 1.71, F=0.0521.
However, the interaction becomes insignificant on the introduction of
controls (Model (3)). Again, these findings closely parallel those for climate
presented earlier.
The trend in Appendix Table A30 is non-linear, with perceptions of
managerial performance deteriorating in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. So,
in Models (4) to (6) in Appendix Table A31 we incorporate a dummy for a
non-linear time trend after 1992. In Model (5) the post-1992 dummy is inter-
acted with union recognition. The linear time trend remains negative and
significant, with the post-1992 dummy also negative and significant, indicat-
ing that there was a deterioration in perceptions of managerial performance
in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. However, the interaction of union recogni-
tion and the post-1992 dummy is positive and significant, suggesting that
perceptions of managerial performance worsened more rapidly in the 1990s
among those in non-unionised workplaces. With controls added, however,
the coefficient for the interaction is no longer significant (Model (6)).70
Using the same set of control variables as those in Appendix Table A30,
we ran separate models for employees in unionised and non-unionised
workplaces. The linear trend is negative and significant for those in
unionised workplaces (–0.012, t=2.82) but insignificant for those in 
non-unionised workplaces (–0.007, t=0.01). The post-1992 dummy, by
contrast, is negative and weakly significant for those in non-unionised
workplaces (–0.14, t=1.63) but insignificant for those in unionised workplaces
(–0.04, t=1.20). This indicates that perceptions of managerial performance
deteriorated in a broadly linear way over the period for employees in unionised
workplaces whereas, among those in non-unionised workplaces, it deterio-
rated significantly in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. We can conclude that the
pattern of decline was somewhat different for employees in unionised and
non-unionised workplaces, but that perceptions of managerial performance
nevertheless declined for both sets of employees over the period.
Have union effects on managerial performance differed with union strength
over time?
Using the same set of controls as in Appendix Table A30 on pooled data for
1989 and 1998, we interacted perceptions of union power with a 1998
dummy to see if perceptions of managerial performance had shifted with
perceptions of union power at the workplace. These interactions were not
significant. Although there may have been a decline in union power at the
workplace over the period, it had no bearing on employees’ perceptions of
managerial performance.
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70 Business cycle controls were not significant and made no difference to the results.
Have union effects on managerial performance differed with changing
management attitudes to union membership?
We conducted a similar exercise to establish whether the hardening attitude
of management to unions may have contributed to deteriorating perceptions
of managerial performance. Analyses of pooled data for 1989 and 1998 found
no evidence of changing perceptions associated with changing perceptions of
management support for unions.
Has the impact of union effectiveness on managerial performance differed
over time?
Finally in this section, we turn to the impact of union effectiveness over time,
as measured by whether employees thought unions were doing their job well
or not. We found no evidence of changes in the impact of union effectiveness
over the period 1983–1998.
Summary of union effects on employee perceptions of the managerial
performance
Across the economy, perceptions of managerial performance were poorer in
the presence of recognised unions, but only in the presence of on-site rep-
resentation. This association between the combination of union recognition
and on-site representation was confirmed in separate analyses for the private
sector. However, in the absence of on-site worker representation, there were
indications that managerial performance was viewed more positively than
among similar employees in non-unionised workplaces.
The positive association between managerial support for union member-
ship and perceptions of better managerial performance can be interpreted in
a number of ways. But it was certainly the case that employees thought
workplaces were better run where management were supportive of unions,
and were more poorly run where managers opposed membership. This is
consistent with the idea that managers can influence performance through
their engagement with unions.
Managers may also be able to influence perceptions of their performance
by ensuring that unions have sufficient power to make a positive contribution
to the running of the workplace, since unions with the ‘right amount of
power’ were associated with better managerial performance than unions with
too little power. If the power balance is right, perceptions of managerial
performance do not differ across employees in unionised and non-unionised
workplaces.
For their part, unions can influence managerial performance by deliver-
ing for their members. They were best able to positively influence managerial
performance where they were perceived to be doing their job well, where they
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had regard to their members’ concerns, and where they contributed to the
smooth running of the workplace. In these circumstances, perceptions of
managerial performance were not significantly different from those in similar
non-unionised workplaces. Conversely, where unions are viewed as ineffec-
tive, managerial performance was poorer than in comparable non-unionised
workplaces.
Repeat cross-section analyses showed that employee perceptions of
managerial performance deteriorated over the period 1983–1998. The pattern
of decline was somewhat different for employees in unionised and non-
unionised workplaces, with the decline in the 1990s being particularly
pronounced among employees in the non-unionised sector. There was no
evidence that union strength, employer attitudes to unions, or perceptions of
union effectiveness were associated with changes in perceptions of climate.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analysed data from the BSAS 1983–1998 to establish
the effect of unions and union membership on employees’ perceptions of
workplace governance over the period. We assess effects on three aspects of
workplace governance: the employee relations climate; managers’ treatment
of employees and unions; and managerial performance. The paper provides
broad support for the three hypotheses explored in the paper. First, that
employees’ perceptions of workplace governance are better where there is a
balance of power between unions and management at the workplace. Second,
employees’ perceptions of workplace governance are better where manage-
ment supports union membership, and are poorest where they actively
discourage membership. Third, employees’ perceptions of union effectiveness
are positively associated with employees’ perceptions of good workplace
governance.
A further hypothesis, namely that perceptions of governance will have
deteriorated since the 1980s in unionised workplaces due to the weaker
position of unions in the workplace, and to declining support for unions
among employers, was not supported. Although we identified deteriorating
perceptions of workplace governance since the 1980s, these trends were
apparent among employees in unionised and non-unionised workplaces, and
there was no evidence to suggest that the trend was associated with a diminu-
tion in union power, managers’ changing attitudes to unions, or the perceived
effectiveness of unions.
The key findings for the 1998 cross-sectional analysis are summarised in
Table 4. They summarise findings for our three key dependent variables:
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employee relations climate, management keeping promises to employees, and
how well the workplace is managed. Results for the whole sample models are
presented, along with the separate analyses for employees in the private and
public sectors.
On average, workplace governance was perceived as poorer among
employees in workplaces with recognised unions, relative to similar employ-
ees in similar non-unionised workplaces, or else there was no significant
difference. However, this is only half the story, since managers and unions
have the opportunity to influence both the size and direction of union effects
on governance.
The positive association between managerial support for union member-
ship and perceptions of better workplace governance can be interpreted in a
number of ways. But it is certainly the case that employees thought that
workplaces had better climate, more trustworthy managers, and were better
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Table 4: Summary of key findings on union effects in 1998
Climate Trust Performance
All Private Public All Private Public All Private Public
Recognition status (ref: no recognition)
Recog: – – – – –
Combinations of recognition and on-site representation (ref: no recognised union)
Rec +
Rep: – – – (–) –
Rec
no rep: – +
Perceptions of union power at the workplace (ref: no recognised union)
Right: (+) + + + –
Too little: – – – – – – –
Too much:
Perceptions of managerial attitudes to union membership (ref: membership ‘not an
issue’)
Support: + + + + + + + + +
Opposed – – – – – – – – –
Perceptions of union effectiveness (ref: no recognised union)
Effective: – (+) –
Ineffective – – – – – – – –
Note: – represents a significant negative effect; + represents a significant positive effect. Blank
represents no significant effect. All effects significant at a 95 per cent confidence level or above,
except those in parentheses which are significant at a 90 per cent confidence level.
managed where managers supported union membership. Perceptions were
poorer across all three dimensions of workplace governance where managers
opposed union membership. This was equally true among employees in
unionised and non-unionised workplaces. This suggests that management can
influence employee perceptions of workplace governance for better or for
worse through their engagement with unions. The results present something
of a puzzle: why is it that managers do not adopt a more positive stance
towards union membership, especially where unions are already in place?
And why is it that management often opposes union membership, incurring
the costs of poorer workplace governance?
Management can also influence employees’ perceptions of workplace
governance by ensuring that unions have sufficient power to make a positive
contribution to the running of the workplace, since unions with the ‘right
amount of power’ were associated with better workplace governance than
those with ‘too little power’. If the power balance is ‘right’, perceptions of
workplace governance were similar to, or better than, perceptions of employ-
ees in non-unionised workplaces. These findings raise another puzzle: why is
it that employers so often retain union recognition, but preside over a decline
in union strength and influence at the workplace? Since weak unions are
particularly bad for employee perceptions of workplace governance, failure
to take action in support of unions may lead to a deterioration in governance.
For their part, unions are best able to contribute to better workplace
governance where they are perceived to be doing their job well, where they
have regard to union members’ problems and complaints, and where they
contribute to the smooth running of the workplace. In these circumstances,
perceptions of workplace governance are generally no different from those of
employees in non-unionised workplaces. However, where unions are viewed
as ineffective, workplace governance is poorer than in comparable non-
unionised workplaces. The question this poses for unions is: what
distinguishes effective unions from ineffective ones, and what conditions are
conducive to effective unionism?
The central question for government raised by this paper is: will the new
statutory framework for union recognition support union effectiveness, or
will it bring into being unions that do not receive the support of manage-
ment, or are otherwise weak or ineffective? The answer to this question will
go some way towards explaining the likely impact of the statutory recogni-
tion procedure on workplace governance.
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Note: Please access the Appendix of tables to accompany this text from the
PSI web site, www.psi.org.uk/publications.
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Appendix
Table A1: Percentage of employees in union and staff association
membership, by year
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
% union 49 47 43 42 40 39 36 37 35 35 32 31 30 29
%union/sa 49 47 47 46 46 44 40 43 40 40 36 36 34 33
Wted 803 762 830 1521 1342 1432 1260 1256 1239 1552 1568 1662 581 1544
Unwted 817 778 857 1532 1381 1462 1307 1236 1144 1447 1448 1534 546 1428
Source: BSAS. Based on responses to the question: ‘Are you now a member of a trade union or staff
association?’ by employees working 10 hours or more per week. The question did not refer to staff
associations in 1983 and 1984.
Table A2: Percentage of employees working in workplaces recognising
unions/staff associations, by year
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
% 66 63 62 62 62 58 58 58 56 54 55 50 50 49
Wted 803 762 830 1521 1342 1432 1260 1256 1239 1552 1568 1662 581 1544
Unwted 817 778 857 1532 1381 1462 1307 1236 1144 1447 1448 1534 546 1428
Source: BSAS. Based on responses to the question: ‘At your place of work are there unions, staff
associations or groups of unions recognised by the management for negotiating pay and conditions
of employment?’ by employees working 10 hours or more per week.
Table A3: Management preference for direct consultation, 1998 
No recognition % Union recognised %
Strongly agree 40 18
Agree 47 36
Neither agree nor disagree 11 23
Disagree 2 22
Strongly disagree 1 2
Wted 1389 795
Unwted 986 1203
Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998. Based on responses to the statement: ‘We would
rather consult direct with employees than with unions.’ Basis in managerial respondents in British
workplaces with 10 or more employees.
Table A4: Percentage of employees who were union members in the past,
by year
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
% 22 23 19 21 19 21 22 19 22 20 21 23
Wted 803 762 830 1521 1342 1432 1260 1256 1239 1568 1662 1544
Unwted 817 778 857 1532 1381 1462 1307 1236 1144 1448 1534 1428
Source: BSAS. Based on responses to the question: ‘Have you ever been a member of a trade union
or staff association?’ Not asked in 1994 and 1997. The series presented is confined to previous
membership of unions. Base is employees working 10 hours or more per week who were not union
members at the time of the survey interview.
Table A5: Awareness of unions at the workplace, 1998
Member, union Member, Non-member, Non-member, 
recognised no union union no union 
recognised recognised recognised
Yes 88 61 70 12
No 11 36 24 83
Don’t know * * 2 2
Not answered 1 2 4 3
Weighted base 9980 1004 6466 10,632
Unweighted base 10,349 1035 6575 10,123
Source: Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998. Base: all employees with individual membership
and workplace recognition data.
Table A6: Perceptions of management–employee relations, all employees
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
V good 38 36 38 34 34 32 38 34 32 29 30 29 36 28
Q. good 47 47 45 47 48 49 45 45 48 47 45 52 43 51
Not v. g. 11 13 12 14 14 14 14 16 14 17 18 14 17 16
N.a.a.g 5 3 4 5 4 4 3 5 6 7 7 6 4 5
Wted 795 756 825 1504 1334 1418 1252 1247 1226 1543 1556 1643 574 1525
Unwted 810 772 851 1514 1372 1449 1300 1227 1133 1438 1436 1515 540 1410
Source: BSAS. Based on responses to the question: ‘In general, how would you describe relations
between management and other employees at your workplace?’ by employees working 10 hours or
more per week. Scale is ‘very good’, ‘quite good’, ‘not very good’, ‘not at all good’.
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Table A7: Perceptions of management–employee relations, employees in
non-unionised workplaces
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
V. good 51 46 53 47 51 42 54 45 45 35 41 35 45 38
Q. good 38 41 36 41 38 44 35 38 39 44 38 49 36 45
Not v. g. 7 10 9 10 8 9 9 13 11 13 16 10 15 12
N.a.a. g. 4 2 2 3 3 5 2 4 6 7 6 5 4 5
Wted 267 279 311 575 500 599 522 522 540 701 699 821 291 784
Unwted 272 276 324 572 511 600 546 531 501 650 647 755 269 707
Source: BSAS. Based on responses to the question: ‘In general, how would you describe relations
between management and other employees at your workplace?’ by employees working 10 hours or
more per week. Scale is ‘very good’, ‘quite good’, ‘not very good’, ‘not at all good’.
Table A8: Perceptions of management–employee relations, employees in
unionised workplaces
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
V. good 31 30 29 26 25 25 27 26 21 23 22 22 27 18
Q. good 52 51 51 51 54 53 51 50 55 50 51 54 51 57
Not v.g. 12 15 15 17 17 18 18 19 17 20 19 17 18 21
N.a.a.g. 5 4 6 6 4 4 4 5 7 7 7 7 4 5
Wted 528 477 514 928 834 819 729 726 686 842 857 822 283 741
Unwted 538 496 527 942 861 849 754 696 632 788 789 760 271 703
Source: BSAS. Based on responses to the question: ‘In general, how would you describe relations
between management and other employees at your workplace?’ by employees working 10 hours or
more per week. Scale is ‘very good’, ‘quite good’, ‘not very good’, ‘not at all good’.
Table A9: Perceptions that management and employees are always at
loggerheads, 1998 
No recognition % Union recognised % All %
Agree strongly 3 1 2
Agree 13 14 13
Neither agree/disagree 18 23 20
Disagree 49 51 50
Disagree strongly 18 11 14
Wted 595 605 1201
Unwted 534 578 1112
Source: BSAS98. Based on responses to the statement: ‘At my workplace, management and employ-
ees are always at loggerheads’ by employees working 10 hours or more per week.
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Table A10: Perceptions that managers keep promises, 1998
No recognition % Union recognised % All %
Agree strongly 8 3 6
Agree 44 36 40
Neither agree/disagree 27 36 31
Disagree 17 22 19
Disagree strongly 4 4 4
Wted 600 603 1203
Unwted 539 575 1114
Source: BSAS98. Based on responses to the statement: ‘Managers at my workplace usually keep their
promises to the employees’ by employees working 10 hours or more per week.
Table A11: Perception that management always try to get the better of
employees, by year
1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998
Agree strongly 12 13 20 17 18 12 20 14 21 17 13
Agree 42 41 43 41 44 50 42 51 46 46 46
Neither 22 19 16 21 19 16 21 19 19 22 25
Disagree 22 25 19 18 16 21 16 15 13 15 15
Disagree strngly 2 3 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Wted 713 664 1201 1247 1113 1172 573 1344 1361 1435 1283
Unwted 738 666 1238 1268 1161 1144 526 1262 1261 1332 1186
Source: BSAS. Based on responses to the statement: ‘Management will always try to get the better of
employees if it gets the chance’ by employees working 10 hours or more per week. Not asked in
1983, 1984, 1997.
Table A12: Perception of how well the workplace is managed, by year
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
V.w.man. 30 29 28 27 26 26 26 25 26 22 23 24 28 24
Q.w.man. 50 52 54 52 54 55 55 55 53 54 54 54 51 54
N.w.man. 20 20 18 21 20 19 19 20 21 23 23 22 21 22
Wted 800 752 827 1503 1333 1407 1249 1247 1230 1547 1565 1651 577 1533
Unwted 815 767 853 1514 1372 1436 1297 1227 1136 1441 1445 1523 543 1418
Source: BSAS. Based on responses to the question: ‘In general, would you say your workplace was
very well managed, quite well managed or not well managed?’ by employees working 10 hours or
more per week. Scale is ‘very well managed’, ‘quite well managed’, ‘not well managed’.
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Table A13: Perception that management ignores unions, 1998
No recognition % Union recognised % All %
Agree strongly 13 4 4
Agree 24 17 17
Neither agree nor disagree 16 25 24
Disagree 42 51 50
Disagree strongly 5 4 4
Wted 47 716 763
Unwted 43 682 725
Source: BSAS98. Based on responses to the statement: ‘The trade unions (staff association(s)) at my
workplace are usually ignored by management’ by employees working 10 hours or more per week in
unionised workplaces.
Table A14: Perceptions of unions’ responsiveness to problems and
complaints, 1998
Member % Non-member % All %
Agree strongly 8 17 13
Agree 55 62 59
Neither agree nor disagree 20 9 14
Disagree 7 9 8
Disagree strongly 1 2 2
Don’t know 9 2 5
Wted 330 473 802
Unwted 316 443 759
Source: BSAS98. Based on responses to the statement: ‘Trade unions (staff association(s)) at my
workplace (take/takes) notice of members’ problems and complaints’ by employees working 10 hours
or more per week in unionised workplaces.
Table A15: Perceptions that unions help in the smooth running of the
workplace, 1998
Non-member % Member % All %
Agree strongly 1 5 4
Agree 29 39 35
Neither agree nor disagree 34 36 35
Disagree 25 17 21
Disagree strongly 2 2 2
Don’t know 8 1 4
Wted 330 473 802
Unwted 316 443 759
Source: BSAS98. Based on responses to the question: ‘Please say how strongly you agree or disagree
[that] (trade unions/staff association(s)) at my workplace (help/helps) make things run more smoothly
at work’ by employees working 10 hours or more per week in unionised workplaces.
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Table A16: Control variables used in pooled analyses for 1983–1998
All Union Non-union
Demographic:
FEM, if female 49 47 50
ETHNIC, if non-white ethnic minority 4 4 4
AGE, age, in years:
AGE1824 15 12 18
AGE2534 26 25 28
AGE3544 26 28 23
AGE4554 22 24 19
AGE5564 11 12 9
AGE65PLS 1 * 2
AGEDK * * *
HEDQUAL, Highest educational qualification (NA 1983, 1984):
IHEDQU_7, No qualifications 24 23 26
IHEDQU_6, Foreign/other qualification 1 1 1
IHEDQU_5, CSE or equivalent 9 8 10
IHEDQU_4, GCSE or equivalent 23 22 25
IHEDQU_3, A level or equivalent 13 13 13
IHEDQU_2, Higher education below degree level 18 20 15
IHEDQU_1, Degree or equivalent 12 14 10
IHEDQU_8, Data missing * * *
UNSAMEMB, if union/staff association member 41 68 5
Job-related characteristics:
RGHCLASS, Hope-Goldthorpe occupational class:
RGHCL1: Professional and management, higher grade 13 15 12
RGHCL2: Professional and management, lower grade 21 22 19
RGHCL3: Routine non-manuals 18 18 18
RGHCL4: Personal service 7 4 10
RGHCL8: Foremen and technicians 7 8 7
RGHCL9: Skilled manual workers 10 10 11
RGHCL10: Semi-skilled and unskilled manuals 22 22 21
Data missing * 1 1
PTEMPEE, part-time employee, self-definition 20 18 23
Workplace-related:
SECTOR, industrial sector:
MANUFAC: Manufacturing 23 24 22
SERVICES: Services 67 68 67
CONSTRU: Construction 4 3 6
OTHERSEC: Other industries 5 6 5
PUBLIC, if public sector 25 40 6
SIZE, N employees at the workplace (NA in 1983):
SIZU10 16 7 27
SIZ1024 16 12 21
SIZ2599 26 25 27
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SI100499 24 30 17
SIZOV499 18 26 7
SIZMIS 1 1 1
Attitudinal data:
LEFTRIG2, Left-right scale running from 1 to 5 
(continuous) 2.5 2.5 2.6
LRLOW, % with score on LEFTRIG2 below 2.5 0.44 0.46 0.40
PAYGAP, perception of pay gap between highest and lowest paid at workplace:
Much too big 18 21 14
Too big 27 30 23
About right 44 40 49
Too small 3 3 3
Much too small * * 1
Don’t know 8 6 10
Other data:
YEAR:
YEAR1, 1983 5 5 4
YEAR2, 1984 4 5 4
YEAR3, 1985 5 5 4
YEAR4, 1986 9 10 8
YEAR5, 1987 8 9 7
YEAR6, 1989 8 8 8
YEAR7, 1990 7 7 7
YEAR8, 1991 7 7 7
YEAR9, 1993 7 7 7
YEAR10, 1994 9 8 9
YEAR11, 1995 9 8 9
YEAR12, 1996 10 7 11
YEAR13, 1997 3 3 4
YEAR14, 1998 9 8 11
REGION:
SCOTLAND: Scotland 9 10 10
NORTH: North, North West, Yorks and Humberside 25 28 28
WALES: Wales 5 6 6
SOUTH: South East, South West and East Anglia 33 29 29
MIDS: East and West Midlands 17 17 17
GTRLON: Greater London 12 11 11
UVRATE, unemployment–vacancy ratio 15.1 15.4 15.4
EMPRATE, % workforce in employment 56.5 56.4 56.4
Base: all employees with non-missing data working 10 hours or more per week. Mean scores based
on pooled data for the period 1983–1998. Column 2 confined to employees in workplaces with
unions recognised for pay bargaining. Column 3 confined to employees in workplaces with no unions
recognised for pay bargaining. Note that this table does not include measures of union strength,
union effectiveness or management support for unions, all of which are presented in the main text.
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Table A17: Control variables used in cross-sectional analysis for 1998
All Union Non-union
Demographic:
FEM, if female 52 53 51
ETHNIC, if non-white ethnic minority 6 6 6
RAGE, age, in years: 39.3 40.5 38.1
HEDQUAL, Highest educational qualification:
IHEDQU_7, No qualifications 17 13 20
IHEDQU_6, Foreign/other qualification 1 1 *
IHEDQU_5, CSE or equivalent 9 8 10
IHEDQU_4, GCSE or equivalent 25 24 25
IHEDQU_3, A level of equivalent 13 12 14
IHEDQU_2, Higher education below degree level 24 28 21
IHEDQU_1, Degree or equivalent 12 14 9
UNSAMEMB, if union/staff association member 33 60 7
UNMEMB, if union member 29 53 6
SAMEMB, if staff association member 4 8 1
PREVMEMB, if not currently union/staff association 
member but was previously 24 20 29
Job-related characteristics:
RGHCLASS, Hope-Goldthorpe occupational class:
RGHCL1: Professional and management, higher grade 15 19 12
RGHCL2: Professional and management, lower grade 24 25 22
RGHCL3: Routine non-manuals 16 16 16
RGHCL4: Personal service 9 8 10
RGHCL8: Foremen and technicians 8 8 8
RGHCL9: Skilled manual workers 9 8 10
RGHCL10: Semi-skilled and unskilled manuals 19 17 22
HOURS, hours worked per week
HRS1015, 10–15 hours 6 5 8
HRS1623, 16–23 hours 12 12 11
HRS2429, 24–29 hours 4 4 5
HRS30PLS, 30+ hours 78 79 77
JTENURE, tenure at current workplace, in months 91.6 118.2 66.1
Workplace-related:
SECTOR, broad sector:
PUBLIC: Public sector 30 53 9
PRIVATE: Private sector 67 46 87
OTHSECT: Voluntary sector 3 1 4
SIZE, N employees at the workplace:
SIZU10 13 4 22
SIZ1024 15 11 19
SIZ2599 26 22 30
SI100499 26 33 20
SIZOV499 19 30 9
Worker representation:
UNIONREC, if recognised union or staff association 49 100 0
UNIREC, if recognised union 45 92 0
SAREC, if recognised staff association 4 8 0
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ACTIVE, if non-recognised union 3 0 6
REP, if on-site worker representative 48 84 14
MRECREP, union/SA member in recognised workplace 
with on-site rep 25 52 0
MRECNREP, union/SA member in recognised workplace 
w/out on-site rep 4 9 0
MNRECREP, union/SA member in non-recognised 
workplace with on-site rep 1 0 2
MNRECNREP, union/SA member in non-recognised 
workplace w/out on-site rep 2 0 5
NMRECREP, non-member in recognised workplace 
with on-site rep 16 32 0
NMRENREP, non-member in recognised workplace 
w/out on-site rep 4 8 0
NMNREREP, non-member in non-recognised workplace 
with on-site rep 6 0 11
NMNRNREP, non-member in non-recognised workplace 
w/out on-site rep 42 0 82
RECREP, recognised workplace with on-site rep 41 84 0
RECNOREP, recognised workplace w/out on-site rep 8 16 0
REPNOREC, non-recognised workplace with on-site rep 5 0 9
NORECREP, non-recognised workplace w/out on-site rep 43 0 85
MEMBREC, union/SA member in recognised workplace 30 60 0
NMEMBREC, non-member in recognised workplace 19 40 0
MEMNOREC, union/SA member in non-recognised 
workplace 4 0 7
NMEMNREC, non-member in non-recognised workplace 48 0 93
Attitudinal data:
LEFTRIG2, Left-right scale running from 1 to 5 
(continuous) 2.52 2.48 2.55
LRLOW, % with score on LEFTRIG2 below 2.5 0.51 0.55 0.48
PAYGAP, perception of pay gap between highest and 
lowest paid at workplace:
Much too big 22 26 19
Too big 28 34 23
About right 41 35 46
Too small 2 1 3
Much too small * * *
Don’t know 6 4 9
Other data:
REGION:
SCOTLAND: Scotland 8 8 8
NORTH: North, North West, Yorks and Humberside 23 26 21
WALES: Wales 6 7 5
SOUTH: South East, South West and East Anglia 33 32 34
MIDS: East and West Midlands 17 16 19
GTRLON: Greater London 11 10 13
Base: all employees with non-missing data in the estimation sample working 10 hours or more per
week. Column 2 confined to employees in workplaces with unions recognised for pay bargaining.
Column 3 confined to employees in workplaces with no unions recognised for pay bargaining. Note
that this table does not include measures of union strength, union effectiveness or management
support for unions, all of which are presented in the main text. * means under 0.5 per cent.
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Table A18: Perceptions of the employee relations climate, whole economy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)















unirec –0.288 –0.250 –0.150
(3.32)** (2.48)* (1.34)
sarec 0.096 0.108 0.131
(0.57) (0.59) (0.64)
active –0.036 0.015 0.063
(0.19) (0.07) (0.31)









rep –0.269 –0.264 –0.117 –0.118
(3.29)** (3.13)** (1.24) (1.25)
Controls? NO NO NO YES YES YES
cut1: –1.889 –1.931 –1.937 –1.730 –1.695 –1.722
(24.75)** (24.31)** (23.99)** (7.50)** (7.34)** (7.46)**
cut2: –1.034 –1.075 –1.079 –0.831 –0.792 –0.821
(18.05)** (17.78)** (17.55)** (3.71)** (3.54)** (3.67)**
cut3: 0.378 0.344 0.344 0.676 0.719 0.688
(7.47)** (6.51)** (6.42)** (3.01)** (3.21)** (3.06)**
Observations 1382 1382 1382 1380 1380 1380
T-statistics in parentheses. * = significant at 95% confidence level. ** = significant at 99% confidence
level or above.
For key to variable names see Appendix Table A17. Controls: gender, age, ethnicity, qualifications,
social class, region, hours, workplace tenure, sector, workplace size. 
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Table A19: Perceptions of the employee relations climate in the public and
private sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private sector Public sector
Workplace unionisation (ref: no union/staff association)
unirec –0.056 –0.530
(0.43) (2.12)*
sarec 0.045 0.032 0.117 0.119
(0.18) (0.12) (0.36) (0.33)
active 0.064 0.053 –0.146 –0.144
(0.24) (0.20) (0.36) (0.33)
rep 0.001 –0.268
(0.01) (1.55)
Union X rep interaction
Union recognition –0.034 –0.532
main effect (0.18) (1.82)



















unsamemb –0.160 –0.158 –0.133 –0.133
(1.46) (1.45) (0.91) (0.91)
Controls? YES YES YES YES YES YES
cut1:Constant –1.752 –1.751 –1.788 –1.614 –1.615 –1.568
(6.05)** (6.04)** (6.13)** (3.25)** (3.17)** (3.10)**
cut2:Constant –0.864 –0.862 –0.898 –0.597 –0.598 –0.555
(3.09)** (3.08)** (3.18)** (1.22) (1.19) (1.11)
cut3:Constant 0.541 0.542 0.509 1.297 1.296 1.331
(1.95) (1.95) (1.82) (2.58)** (2.52)* (2.61)**
Observations 909 909 909 431 431 431
T-statistics in parentheses. * = significant at 95% confidence level. ** = significant at 99% confidence
level or above. For key to variable names see Appendix Table A17. Controls: gender, age, ethnicity,
qualifications, social class, region, hours, workplace tenure, sector, workplace size. 
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Table A20: The effect of union power on employee perceptions of the
employee relations climate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Union power:
Tupowtm 0.097 0.669 0.537 0.834 –0.162 0.521
(0.30) (1.87) (1.46) (1.74) (0.46) (0.96)
Tupowrit 0.083 0.687 0.827 0.640 0.228 –0.420
(0.79) (6.97)** (6.44)** (4.05)** (1.85) (1.53)
Tupowtl –0.496 –0.323 –1.105
(4.48)** (2.34)* (3.99)**
Tupowmis 0.092 0.645 0.735 0.578 0.283 –0.381
(0.57) (2.57)* (1.63) (1.94) (1.53) (1.05)
Individual membership status (ref: never member)
Unmemb –0.179 –0.191 –0.097 –0.179
(1.81) (1.40) (0.73) (0.93)
Samemb 0.049 0.200 –0.229 0.414
(0.31) (0.97) (0.93) (1.57)
Prevmemb –0.101 –0.052 –0.077 0.086
(1.07) (0.32) (0.73) (0.40)
Controls? YES YES YES YES YES YES
cut1:Constant –1.644 –1.188 –0.748 –1.852 –1.741 –1.508
(7.07)** (3.43)** (1.53) (3.69)** (6.01)** (2.80)**
cut2:Constant –0.724 –0.087 0.354 –0.568 –0.834 –0.458
(3.21)** (0.25) (0.73) (1.12) (2.98)** (0.87)
cut3:Constant 0.820 1.665 2.280 1.140 0.595 1.544
(3.66)** (4.80)** (4.62)** (2.26)* (2.15)* (2.89)**
Observations 1380 731 434 297 909 431
Model (1) = whole sample. Model (2) = employees in unionised sector. Model (3) = union members in
unionised sector. Model (4) = union non-members in unionised sector. Model (5) = employees in
private sector. Model (6) = employees in public sector. T-statistics in parentheses. * = significant at
95% confidence level. ** = significant at 99% confidence level or above. For key to variable names
see Appendix Table A17. Reference categories for union power: In models (1), (5) and (6) no recog-
nised union; in (2), (3) and (4), union with too little power. Controls: gender, age, ethnicity,
qualifications, social class, region, hours, workplace tenure, sector, workplace size.
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Table A21: The effect of management attitudes to unions on employee
perceptions of the employee relations climate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Management attitudes to union membership (ref: not an issue)
Imanat_1 0.588 0.629 0.745 0.909 0.719 0.622
(4.04)** (3.74)** (3.55)** (2.77)** (2.37)* (3.04)**
Imanat_2 0.047 0.013 0.130 –0.161 0.116 0.000
(0.55) (0.12) (0.87) (0.99) (0.98) (0.00)
Imanat_3 –0.701 –0.791 –0.883 –0.941 –0.607 –0.867
(5.93)** (3.51)** (2.87)** (2.73)** (4.81)** (2.32)*
Imanat_5 –0.181 –0.306 –0.239 –0.540 –0.232 0.033
(0.92) (1.39) (1.04) (1.98)* (0.92) (0.11)
Workplace-level unionisation (ref: no union)
Unirec –0.309 –0.252 –0.640
(2.59)** (1.75) (2.30)*
Sarec 0.084 0.377 0.691 0.425 0.018 –0.184
(0.39) (1.77) (3.37)** (1.50) (0.06) (0.53)
Active 0.034 0.327 0.418 0.393 0.103 –0.315
(0.17) (1.62) (1.05) (1.76) (0.40) (0.74)
Rep –0.101 –0.207 –0.484 0.033 0.018 –0.250
(1.08) (1.59) (2.55)* (0.17) (0.15) (1.41)
Individual membership status (ref: never member)
unmemb –0.269 –0.358 –0.207 –0.346
(2.68)** (2.64)** (1.58) (1.74)
samemb –0.108 –0.047 –0.305 0.048
(0.57) (0.20) (1.04) (0.18)
prevmemb –0.065 –0.130 –0.047 –0.046
(0.70) (0.85) (0.44) (0.22)
Controls? YES YES YES YES YES YES
cut1:Constant –1.820 –1.846 –1.416 –2.319 –1.812 –1.859
(7.71)** (4.90)** (2.65)** (4.15)** (6.14)** (3.70)**
cut2:Constant –0.879 –0.737 –0.290 –1.008 –0.886 –0.792
(3.85)** (1.98)* (0.55) (1.80) (3.13)** (1.58)
cut3:Constant 0.680 0.988 1.610 0.698 0.562 1.167
(2.99)** (2.66)** (3.01)** (1.23) (2.00)* (2.27)*
Observations 1380 731 434 297 909 431
T-statistics in parentheses. * = significant at 95% confidence level. ** = significant at 99% confidence
level or above. For key to variable names see Appendix Table A17. Model (1) = whole sample. Model
(2) = employees in unionised sector. Model (3) = union members in unionised sector. Model (4) =
union non-members in unionised sector. Model (5) = employees in private sector. Model (6) = employ-
ees in public sector. Controls: gender, age, ethnicity, qualifications, social class, region, hours,
workplace tenure, sector, workplace size.
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Table A22: The effect of unions doing their job well on employee 
perceptions of the employee relations climate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Union doing job well?
Ujobwyes –0.095 0.054 –0.544
(0.94) (0.44) (2.26)*
Ujobwno –0.427 –0.435 –0.549 –0.390 –0.206 –1.089
(3.89)** (4.38)** (4.32)** (2.31)* (1.61) (4.06)**
Ujobwdk 0.170 0.276 0.186 0.337 0.313 –0.040
(0.82) (1.33) (0.50) (1.41) (1.11) (0.13)
Individual membership status (ref: never member)
unmemb –0.245 –0.285 –0.197 –0.222
(2.48)* (2.15)* (1.50) (1.17)
samemb 0.034 0.151 –0.278 0.424
(0.21) (0.75) (1.12) (1.66)
prevmemb –0.103 –0.041 –0.093 0.050
(1.11) (0.27) (0.89) (0.24)
Controls? YES YES YES YES YES YES
cut1:Constant –1.688 –1.804 –1.515 –2.213 –1.739 –1.668
(7.38)** (5.07)** (2.99)** (4.27)** (6.03)** (3.43)**
cut2:Constant –0.777 –0.721 –0.433 –0.956 –0.846 –0.610
(3.51)** (2.04)* (0.87) (1.83) (3.04)** (1.29)
cut3:Constant 0.745 0.975 1.399 0.723 0.567 1.337
(3.37)** (2.76)** (2.77)** (1.38) (2.05)* (2.75)**
Observations 1380 731 434 297 909 431
T-statistics in parentheses. * = significant at 95% confidence level. ** = significant at 99% confidence
level or above. For key to variable names see Appendix Table A17. Model (1) = whole sample. Model
(2) = employees in unionised sector. Model (3) = union members in unionised sector. Model (4) =
union non-members in unionised sector. Model (5) = employees in private sector. Model (6) = employ-
ees in public sector. See Appendix Table A17 for key to variable names. Reference categories: In
models (1), (5) and (6) no recognised union; in (2), (3) and (4), union doing job well. Controls: gender,
age, ethnicity, qualifications, social class, region, hours, workplace tenure, sector, workplace size.
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Table A23: Perception of the employee relations climate, 1983–1998
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year (ref: 1983)
Iyear_2 –0.025 –0.041 –0.083 –0.095 –0.098
(0.42) (0.69) (0.75) (0.85) (0.88)
Iyear_3 –0.006 –0.023 0.054 0.048 0.044
(0.11) (0.40) (0.51) (0.45) (0.41)
Iyear_4 –0.110 –0.129 –0.073 –0.069 –0.074
(2.18)* (2.55)* (0.77) (0.73) (0.79)
Iyear_5 –0.063 –0.078 0.021 0.028 0.025
(1.23) (1.52) (0.22) (0.29) (0.26)
Iyear_6 –0.120 –0.159 –0.203 –0.195 –0.201
(2.36)* (3.09)** (2.12)* (2.05)* (2.12)*
Iyear_7 –0.014 –0.046 0.071 0.063 0.059
(0.28) (0.87) (0.74) (0.66) (0.61)
Iyear_8 –0.139 –0.172 –0.193 –0.224 –0.233
(2.55)* (3.13)** (1.95) (1.93) (2.01)*
Iyear_9 –0.174 –0.219 –0.205 –0.228 –0.236
(3.21)** (4.01)** (2.05)* (2.30)* (2.37)*
Iyear_10 –0.279 –0.335 –0.440 –0.452 –0.459
(5.37)** (6.38)** (4.64)** (4.81)** (4.88)**
Iyear_11 –0.235 –0.288 –0.333 –0.359 –0.367
(4.48)** (5.45)** (3.46)** (3.75)** (3.83)**
Iyear_12 –0.214 –0.286 –0.334 –0.355 –0.355
(4.21)** (5.57)** (3.64)** (3.91)** (3.90)**
Iyear_13 –0.089 –0.164 –0.220 –0.235 –0.239
(1.34) (2.44)* (1.91) (2.09)* (2.12)*
Iyear_14 –0.219 –0.298 –0.305 –0.319 –0.321
(4.31)** (5.81)** (3.30)** (3.49)** (3.51)**
Unionrec –0.418
(21.65)**
Union recognition X year interactions
Recognition main effect –0.428 –0.399 –0.263
(4.59)** (4.30)** (2.80)**
Iuy_1_2 0.065 0.078 0.082
(0.50) (0.59) (0.62)
Iuy_1_3 –0.119 –0.104 –0.093
(0.95) (0.82) (0.74)
Iuy_1_4 –0.089 –0.099 –0.091
(0.79) (0.89) (0.82)
Iuy_1_5 –0.154 –0.179 –0.178
(1.33) (1.56) (1.55)
Iuy_1_6 0.073 0.042 0.049
(0.64) (0.37) (0.44)
Iuy_1_7 –0.193 –0.219 –0.225
(1.67) (1.90) (1.95)
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Iuy_1_8 0.032 0.077 0.084
(0.27) (0.55) (0.60)
Iuy_1_9 –0.025 –0.034 –0.034
(0.21) (0.28) (0.29)
Iuy_1_10 0.186 0.144 0.148
(1.64) (1.27) (1.31)
Iuy_1_11 0.078 0.045 0.036
(0.68) (0.39) (0.31)
Iuy_1_12 0.089 0.053 0.038
(0.80) (0.48) (0.34)
Iuy_1_13 0.106 0.071 0.055
(0.75) (0.51) (0.39)




Controls? NO NO NO YES YES
cut1:Constant –1.783 –2.090 –2.098 –1.985 –1.984
(40.26)** (43.81)** (25.51)** (22.41)** (22.39)**
cut2:Constant –0.985 –1.285 –1.294 –1.167 –1.164
(23.46)** (28.61)** (16.02)** (13.37)** (13.32)**
cut3:Constant 0.314 0.042 0.035 0.197 0.205
(7.57)** (0.96) (0.44) (2.26)* (2.36)*
Observations 16470 16470 16470 15834 15834
T-statistics in parentheses. * = significant at 95% confidence level. ** = significant at 99% confidence
level or above. See Appendix Table A16 for key to variable names. Controls: gender, ethnicity, age,
part-time, sector, social class, region.
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Table A24: Perception of the employee relations climate, 1983–1998 with
non-linear trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
year2 –0.015 –0.027 –0.028 –0.006 –0.012 –0.015
(6.30)** (6.29)** (6.43)** (1.09) (1.98) (2.48)*
post90 –0.098
(1.64)
Iunion_1 –0.520 –0.333 –0.490 –0.335









Controls? NO NO YES NO NO YES
cut1:Constant –1.783 –2.155 –2.042 –1.752 –2.109 –2.008
(64.22)** (42.25)** (24.22)** (56.13)** (51.62)** (27.66)**
cut2:Constant –0.986 –1.352 –1.224 –0.954 –1.305 –1.189
(40.98)** (29.05)** (15.76)** (31.75)** (35.58)** (17.94)**
cut3:Constant 0.311 –0.026 0.142 0.343 0.021 0.177
(12.28)** (0.54) (1.62) (12.36)** (0.57) (2.42)*
Observations 16490 16490 15853 16490 16490 15853
T-statistics in parentheses. * = significant at 95% confidence level. ** = significant at 99% confidence
level or above. See Appendix Table A16 for key to variable names. Controls: gender, ethnicity, age,
part-time, sector, social class, region.
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Table A25: Perceptions that managers keep promises in 1998, whole
economy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unionrec –0.262 –0.149
(3.82)** (1.70)
Unirec –0.191 –0.102 –0.015
(2.03)* (0.93) (0.14)
Sarec 0.015 0.053 0.013
(0.08) (0.26) (0.06)














Rep –0.167 –0.144 –0.001 0.006
(1.89) (1.56) (0.01) (0.06)
Controls? NO NO NO YES YES YES
cut1:Constant –1.882 –1.912 –1.920 –1.750 –1.734 –1.737
(21.47)** (21.05)** (20.91)** (7.36)** (7.28)** (7.31)**
cut2:Constant –0.875 –0.903 –0.911 –0.666 –0.640 –0.645
(14.21)** (14.13)** (13.94)** (2.82)** (2.69)** (2.72)**
cut3:Constant –0.005 –0.031 –0.038 0.267 0.296 0.290
(0.09) (0.54) (0.64) (1.13) (1.24) (1.22)
cut4:Constant 1.469 1.446 1.441 1.851 1.881 1.873
(19.61)** (19.11)** (18.94)** (7.60)** (7.68)** (7.65)**
Observations 1116 1116 1116 1114 1114 1114
T-statistics in parentheses. * = significant at 95% confidence level. ** = significant at 99% confidence
level or above. For key to meaning of variables see Appendix Table A17. Reference categories: In
M(1) and M(2) no recognised union; in M(3)–(5), no union; in M(6), non-member in workplace
without recognised union/sa. Controls: gender, age, ethnicity, qualifications, social class, region,
hours, workplace tenure, sector, workplace size. 
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Table A26: Perceptions of union power and management keeping promises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Union power:
Tupowtm –0.266 –0.035 –0.344 0.291 –0.126 –0.635
(1.11) (0.13) (1.53) (0.70) (0.63) (1.07)
Tupowrit 0.314 0.704 0.697 0.759 0.388 0.205
(3.04)** (6.76)** (5.28)** (4.61)** (3.13)** (0.75)
Tupowtl –0.301 –0.241 –0.402
(2.55)* (1.52) (1.42)
Tupowmis 0.054 0.364 0.486 0.284 0.007 0.279
(0.37) (1.73) (1.40) (1.02) (0.04) (0.76)
Union status (ref: never member)
Unmemb –0.134 –0.071 –0.249 –0.081
(1.33) (0.54) (1.73) (0.48)
Samemb 0.055 0.163 0.225 –0.020
(0.32) (0.78) (1.11) (0.08)
Prevmemb 0.036 0.248 –0.017 0.174
(0.38) (1.70) (0.16) (0.80)
cut1:Constant –1.769 –1.381 –1.572 –1.429 –2.087 –0.863
(7.41)** (4.27)** (3.44)** (2.51)* (6.54)** (1.77)
cut2:Constant –0.644 –0.108 –0.284 0.097 –0.926 0.237
(2.69)** (0.34) (0.64) (0.18) (2.89)** (0.49)
cut3:Constant 0.319 1.001 0.703 1.572 –0.024 1.374
(1.33) (3.06)** (1.54) (2.90)** (0.08) (2.83)**
cut4:Constant 1.926 2.798 2.454 3.671 1.608 3.065
(7.77)** (7.82)** (4.91)** (6.31)** (4.90)** (6.10)**
Observations 1114 615 363 252 712 368
T-statistics in parentheses. * = significant at 95% confidence level. ** = significant at 99% confidence
level or above. For key to meaning of variables see Appendix Table A17. Model (1) = whole sample.
Model (2) = employees in unionised sector. Model (3) = union members in unionised sector. Model (4)
= union non-members in unionised sector. Model (5) = employees in private sector. Model (6) =
employees in public sector. See Appendix Table A17 for key to variable names. Reference categories:
In models (1), (5) and (6) no recognised union; in (2), (3) and (4), union with too little power.
Controls: gender, age, ethnicity, qualifications, social class, region, hours, workplace tenure, sector,
workplace size.
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Table A27: Perceptions that managers will try to get the better of 
employees if they get the chance, 1985–1998
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
year2 0.013 0.015 0.021 0.026 0.022
(1.53) (1.80) (2.15) (2.99)* (2.44)*
unionrec –0.039
(1.71)
Iunion_1 0.125 –0.109 –0.109
(4.76)** (2.54)* (2.57)*
IuXyea_1 –0.001 0.007 0.007
(0.54) (2.37)* (2.40)*
unsamemb 0.298 0.296 0.298
(7.90)** (8.00)** (7.92)**
Controls? NO NO YES YES YES
cut1 –0.763 –0.681 –0.429 –0.358 –0.399
(8.45)** (7.72)** (4.02)** (4.36)** (4.86)**
cut2 –0.161 –0.078 0.238 0.310 0.268
(1.97) (0.97) (2.43)* (3.15)* (2.76)*
cut3 1.115 1.200 1.592 1.664 1.622
(12.59)** (14.09)** (17.00)** (15.30)** (15.61)**
Observations 11451 11451 10851 10851 10851
T-statistics in parentheses. * = significant at 95% confidence level. ** = significant at 99% confidence
level or above. See Appendix Table A16 for key to variable names. Controls: gender, age, ethnicity,
qualifications, social class, part-time, sector, workplace size, region, unemployment–vacancy ratio.
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Table A28: Perceptions of how well the workplace is managed, whole
sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
unionrec –0.411 –0.219
(6.28)** (2.55)*
unirec –0.275 –0.223 –0.112
(2.98)** (2.07)* (0.99)
sarec –0.031 0.009 –0.067
(0.17) (0.05) (0.32)














rep –0.275 –0.241 –0.163 –0.158 –0.174















Controls? NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
cut1 –0.995 –1.037 –1.047 –1.026 –0.994 –1.003 –0.987
(18.37)** (18.16)** (18.03)** (4.44)** (4.32)** (4.32)** (4.24)**
cut2 0.527 0.492 0.485 0.572 0.612 0.599 0.620
(10.51)** (9.46)** (9.20)** (2.48)* (2.66)** (2.58)** (2.66)**
Obs 1388 1388 1388 1386 1386 1386 1386
T-statistics in parentheses. * = significant at 95% confidence level. ** = significant at 99% confidence
level or above. For key to meaning of variables see Appendix Table A17. Reference categories: In
M(3), M(4) and M(5), no union/staff association; in M(4) and (5) never union/sa member; in M(6) non-
member in a workplace without union recognition or an on-site worker representative. Controls:
gender, age, ethnicity, qualifications, social class, workplace tenure, region, hours, sector, workplace
size.
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Table A29: Union power and employee perceptions of how well the
workplace is managed 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Union power:
Tupowtm –0.315 0.151 0.289 0.336 –0.249 –0.734
(1.42) (0.65) (0.70) (1.04) (0.92) (1.59)
Tupowrit 0.094 0.631 0.579 0.851 0.263 –0.460
(0.87) (6.00)** (4.36)** (4.66)** (1.98)* (2.03)*
Tupowtl –0.485 –0.518 –0.917
(4.12)** (3.43)** (3.74)**
Tupowmis 0.139 0.402 0.148 0.561 0.378 –0.523
(0.99) (1.95) (0.68) (2.17)* (2.36)* (1.74)
Membership status (ref: never member)
unmemb –0.204 –0.158 –0.075 –0.386
(1.96) (1.19) (0.53) (2.06)*
samemb 0.182 0.248 0.379 0.061
(1.02) (1.18) (1.30) (0.24)
prevmemb –0.002 0.135 0.057 –0.069
(0.02) (0.83) (0.54) (0.32)
Controls? YES YES YES YES YES YES
cut1:Constant –0.901 –0.510 –0.490 –0.462 –1.148 –0.551
(3.91)** (1.41) (0.94) (0.85) (4.11)** (1.08)
cut2:Constant 0.736 1.233 1.265 1.372 0.454 1.333
(3.18)** (3.32)** (2.35)* (2.45)* (1.62) (2.55)*
Observations 1386 737 433 304 910 436
Model (1) = whole sample. Model (2) = employees in unionised sector. Model (3) = union members in
unionised sector. Model (4) = union non-members in unionised sector. Model (5) = employees in
private sector. Model (6) = employees in public sector. See Appendix Table A17 for key to variable
names. Reference categories: In models (1), (5) and (6) no recognised union; in (2), (3) and (4), union
with too little power. Controls: gender, age, ethnicity, qualifications, social class, workplace tenure,
region, hours, sector, workplace size.
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Table A30: Perceptions of how well the workplace is managed, 1983–1998
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year (ref: 1983)
Iyear_2 –0.020 –0.033 –0.043 –0.043 –0.047
(0.32) (0.54) (0.39) (0.39) (0.43)
Iyear_3 –0.016 –0.030 –0.057 –0.056 –0.060
(0.28) (0.51) (0.56) (0.56) (0.60)
Iyear_4 –0.063 –0.079 –0.107 –0.121 –0.126
(1.21) (1.51) (1.17) (1.32) (1.38)
Iyear_5 –0.061 –0.075 –0.011 –0.002 –0.004
(1.14) (1.41) (0.12) (0.02) (0.04)
Iyear_6 –0.042 –0.073 –0.153 –0.128 –0.133
(0.80) (1.38) (1.65) (1.40) (1.46)
Iyear_7 –0.050 –0.079 –0.101 –0.109 –0.113
(0.94) (1.48) (1.11) (1.20) (1.25)
Iyear_8 –0.092 –0.120 –0.210 –0.213 –0.220
(1.67) (2.16)* (2.25)* (1.96) (2.03)*
Iyear_9 –0.091 –0.128 –0.167 –0.191 –0.197
(1.63) (2.30)* (1.79) (2.05)* (2.12)*
Iyear_10 –0.189 –0.234 –0.367 –0.376 –0.381
(3.56)** (4.39)** (4.03)** (4.16)** (4.22)**
Iyear_11 –0.167 –0.210 –0.336 –0.346 –0.353
(3.06)** (3.83)** (3.63)** (3.76)** (3.83)**
Iyear_12 –0.140 –0.199 –0.266 –0.281 –0.281
(2.67)** (3.79)** (2.98)** (3.16)** (3.16)**
Iyear_13 –0.046 –0.107 –0.212 –0.209 –0.211
(0.68) (1.56) (1.90) (1.92) (1.94)
Iyear_14 –0.132 –0.196 –0.231 –0.241 –0.241
(2.47)* (3.66)** (2.59)** (2.70)** (2.71)**
unionrec –0.347
(18.16)**
Iunion_1 –0.432 –0.396 –0.275
(4.67)** (4.30)** (2.94)**
Iuy_1_2 0.010 0.017 0.022
(0.08) (0.13) (0.17)
Iuy_1_3 0.037 0.041 0.050
(0.30) (0.33) (0.40)
Iuy_1_4 0.038 0.050 0.057
(0.34) (0.45) (0.51)
Iuy_1_5 –0.107 –0.131 –0.131
(0.94) (1.16) (1.15)
Iuy_1_6 0.125 0.082 0.090
(1.11) (0.73) (0.80)
Iuy_1_7 0.026 0.011 0.006
(0.23) (0.10) (0.05)
Iuy_1_8 0.139 0.159 0.165
(1.20) (1.19) (1.24)
Iuy_1_9 0.054 0.052 0.051
(0.46) (0.44) (0.44)
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Iuy_1_10 0.225 0.186 0.191
(2.01)* (1.67) (1.70)
Iuy_1_11 0.211 0.164 0.157
(1.82) (1.43) (1.36)
Iuy_1_12 0.105 0.070 0.056
(0.94) (0.64) (0.51)
Iuy_1_13 0.182 0.133 0.118
(1.29) (0.96) (0.85)




Controls? NO NO NO YES YES
Observations 16484 16484 16484 15849 15849
See Appendix Table A16 for key to variable names. Controls: gender, age, ethnicity, part-time, sector,
social class, region.
Table A31: Perceptions of managerial performance, 1983–1998 with non-
linear trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
year2 –0.010 –0.019 –0.020 –0.004 –0.008 –0.010
(5.31)** (5.05)** (5.13)** (1.25) (2.44)* (3.03)**
Iunion_1 –0.441 –0.265 –0.393 –0.251











Controls? NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 16484 16484 15849 16484 16484 15849
For key to meaning of variables see Appendix Table A16. Controls: gender, age, ethnicity, social class,
part-time, sector, region.
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